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1

Introduction

In our rapidly changing world, most modern organizations are embedded in highly dynamic environments. For the management of an organization, the first essential step to
successful decision-making is the basic task of obtaining an accurate view of the environment.1 For instance, this can be the foundation for defining a mission statement, as
argued, e.g., in Bolton et al. (2013). Recently, there have been a number of contributions
showing that organizations can improve their decision-making upon using the expertise
of a single individual by harnessing the wisdom of crowds (e.g., Surowiecki 2004; Mannes
2009; Keuschnigg and Ganser 2017). However, this literature has not analyzed whether
a team’s ability to learn from each other depends on characteristics of the team leader.
Given the initial level of information of each team member, the accuracy of the updated opinions depends on the social learning process within the team. Many teams are
organized such that one person, the team leader, directly communicates with each team
member while the other members often communicate only indirectly with each other –
via the team leader. In this paper, we address the question of how the selection of the
team leader affects the performance of social learning in the team. Is it necessary that the
central person is the one with the highest expertise? How does self-confidence affect the
process of social learning? Should the selection criterion be declared or rather hidden?
Answering these questions is important for the design of successful organizations.
To address these questions, we set up a lab experiment in which subjects are asked
to answer incentivized estimation questions repeatedly. After each round, subjects can
observe the guesses and the confidence levels of some of their team members according to a
star network with the leader at the center. Thus, every team member observes the guesses
of the leader, while only the leader observes the guesses of all members. We randomly
allocate subjects into three treatments, which differ by the criterion that determines how
the team leader is selected. In the baseline treatment (T0), the leader, i.e., the center,
is selected at random. In the accuracy treatment (T1), the leader is the group member
whose estimation of a related question was the most accurate in the team. Finally, in the
confidence treatment (T2), the team member with the highest stated level of confidence
(in the own answer of a related question) is selected. Potential ties in maximal accuracy
or maximal confidence are broken at random.
Interestingly, a set of theoretical models following from the Bayesian approach to
social learning predict for this setting that the selection of the center does not matter
for the outcome, apart from the first two rounds, and that social learning is efficient.2
The reason is that agents can exchange (“communicate”) their opinions such that proper
1

Indeed, disastrous decisions can often be traced back to management teams whose members are in
disagreement, or – what is arguably even worse – who unintendedly agree on a distorted view of reality.
2
For instance, Gale and Kariv (2003), Mueller-Frank (2013), and Rosenberg et al. (2009) provide
frameworks to study social learning among rational agents who are Bayesian updaters.
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aggregation leads to a common estimate (consensus) that is independent of who is at
the center of the communication network. In contrast, a set of models of naı̈ve social
learning predict a strong impact of the center on the same process, which induces an
inefficient outcome.3 Based on the assumption that subjects fail to account correctly for
the repetition of the center’s and the others’ initial opinion, they predict that consensus
is approached over time, but with a strong “bias” towards the center’s initial opinion. In
particular, the center’s weight on the consensus opinion is predicted to be proportional to
her eigenvector centrality, which is several times larger than the other team members’, in
standard specifications of a naı̈ve model of social learning. Unless the leader is much better
infomed than the other team members, this is suboptimal, giving the leader’s opinion too
much weight. Now, any leader characteristic that further amplifies the weight of the
leader’s opinion undermines performance. As such we study the leader’s self-confidence,
as well as the declaration of why the leader was selected.
Results. In the experiment, we assess performance by the proximity of a guess to the
correct answer. In particular, we measure the individual and the collective errors of
the team’s guesses, and use a measure of the wisdom of the crowds. Our first result is
that leader selection based on accuracy (T1) does not outperform the random selection
(T0), while leader selection based on confidence (T2) even undermines performance. The
reason for this surprising result becomes apparent when isolating the effect of declaring
how the leader is selected. The declaration of the leader as somewhat superior, be it in
terms of past performance (T1) or of confidence (T2), induces the other team members
to put more weight on the leader’s opinion, making the team vulnerable to be misled
by a single person. In contrast, teams with random leaders more equally weight each
other’s opinions with the consequence of a higher performance. On top of these effects,
we assess how team performance is affected by (judgmental) overconfidence, which is the
tendency to provide too narrow confidence intervals for one’s estimates (e.g., Soll and
Klayman (2004); Moore and Healy (2008); Herz et al. (2014)). It turns out that both
overconfident leaders and overconfident other team members undermine performance,
while overconfident leaders are worse. Hence, when designing a procedure for leader
selection in a situation in which social learning is important, declared random selection
is a viable option and overconfidence should be avoided.
In the second part of the paper, we set up a horse race between different models of
social learning to shed more light on individual learning behavior and on the mechanisms
of how leader selection affects the wisdom of crowds in networks. Despite a long tradition
of theoretical insights and a growing body of empirical research, social learning behavior
is still far from being fully understood. In line with the previous literature, we observe
3

For instance, DeGroot (1974), Friedkin and Johnsen (1990), DeMarzo et al. (2003), Golub and
Jackson (2010), and Acemoglu et al. (2010) study social learning among naı̈ve agents.
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that simple models (of naı̈ve social learning) generally fit better than sophisticated models (of Bayesian social learning). This has the consequence that the leader’s weight on
the long-term opinion is large already due to her central position in the network structure. Moreover, the experimental data reveal that an important pattern is missing in
both theoretical approaches: People tend to adapt their opinion less than predicted, a
pattern called conservatism. Conservatism is a very common finding in experiments on
belief updating and can be caused by (judgmental) overconfidence, as we show in this paper.4 We incorporate this feature, which is missing in the theoretical literature on social
learning, into both model classes and observe that incorporating conservatism improves
the model fit of both model classes. Hence, there is important feedback from our data
to theory development. Incorporating conservatism is not only a behavioral twist that
matches empirical findings, but it also gives an additional reason for why overconfident
leaders undermine performance.
Methodological Approach. In laboratory experiments (and in lab in the field experiments), theoretical models can be directly tested. For instance, Corazzini et al. (2012),
Grimm and Mengel (2016), and Chandrasekhar et al. (2016) compare sophisticated models of Bayesian learning with simple models of naı̈ve learning in settings in which their
predictions diverge. The common conclusion is that the observations are more often consistent with the simple models. Similarly, Choi et al. (2005), Çelen and Kariv (2005), and
Çelen et al. (2010) study predictions of social learning models experimentally. A caveat of
this theory-testing approach is that the participants are confronted with highly stylized
tasks such as guessing an average (or its sign) of randomly drawn numbers (Corazzini
et al., 2012; Çelen and Kariv, 2005; Çelen et al., 2010) or finding an abstract true state
(Choi et al., 2005; Grimm and Mengel, 2016; Chandrasekhar et al., 2016). It is questionable how the investigated learning behavior transfers to settings with real questions. A
lab in the field approach (Chandrasekhar et al., 2016) does not fully mitigate this issue
of external validity, because the types of questions are still often stylized. At the other
side of the spectrum, real teams could be studied in the field to address our main research
question (without the issue of external validity). However, besides the issues of noise,
missing values, and the problem to measure performance of social learning, there would
be a severe endogeneity problem. First, because face-to-face interaction gives rise to effects (e.g., due to charisma), which are difficult to control for, and second, because there is
usually no proper randomization on who becomes a leader. For these reasons, we decided
to use some middle ground between these two approaches (theory-testing experiment and
4

Experiments on belief updating frequently find that real people are more conservative updaters than
the theoretical model would predict (Mobius et al., 2011; Ambuehl and Li, 2014; Mannes and Moore,
2013), a pattern that has already been summarized in a classic survey (Peterson and Beach, 1967):
“when statistical man and subjects start with the same prior probabilities for two population proportions,
subjects revise their probabilities in the same direction but not as much as statistical man does[.]”
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field data) in order to complement them. For that purpose, we imported a method developed outside of economics which has been increasingly used recently (Lorenz et al., 2011;
Rauhut and Lorenz, 2011). Participants are asked to answer knowledge questions about
vaguely known facts for which the true answer is known (and could in principle easily
be looked up, e.g., on Wikipedia.com). The questions cover various topics and create
a natural uncertainty among the participants who are paid according to their answers’
accuracy. Arguably, teams who are able to estimate such factual questions accurately are
also better at estimating states that cannot be simply measured, or at estimating future
states of the world (which is of high relevance in real managerial or political teams). In
our experiment, however, the quality of social learning can be assessed without waiting
for the future to realize. The realism of that approach already changes the way subjects
communicate with each other because, given that there is no stylized draw of signals which
is common knowledge, it becomes important not only to communicate the guess, but also
the own confidence in the guess. We consider it as a realistic assumption that people can
“tag” the pieces of information they pass on with a confidence level by stating how confident they feel about their own guess.5 This aspect is missing in most other experiments
of social learning because it is simply not necessary to communicate confidence if signal
quality is artificially made common knowledge.
Contribution. Our paper entails three contributions. First, we provide empirical evidence for the superiority of a selection procedure that is based on random leader selection (“sortition”). For both corporate and political governance, sortition (also called
demarchy, allotment, or aleatory democracy) is discussed as an alternative selection procedure, which has its roots in ancient Athens and medieval Italy (Zeitoun et al., 2014;
Frey and Osterloh, 2016). Despite a long list of claimed advantages of this procedure,
empirical evidence showing its superiority is very rare. One exception is the study by
Haslam et al. (1998), which shows experimentally that randomly selected leaders can enhance team performance in a task of deciding upon priorities in a hypothetical survival
situation (e.g., after a plane crash). The mechanism behind the effect, however, remains
largely unclear.6 Our results not only show that random selection can be beneficial compared to selection based on confidence, but also demonstrate that it is the declaration of
randomness rather than the selection at random per se that is the crucial aspect. The
strength of random selection is based on the fact that the leader’s influence on team
members is not amplified by declaring the leader’s specialty. Since the leader is already
special because of her network position, additionally highlighting the leader’s properties
5

This is similar to the literature that considers “tagging” pieces of information with their source
(Acemoglu et al., 2014; Phan et al., 2015).
6
Interestingly, they also observe that randomly selected leaders are, despite their superior performance,
often perceived by their team members as less effective than formally selected leaders.
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by declaring them to be relevant for selecting the leader makes the others disrespect their
own opinions, which results in a loss, because the wisdom of crowds is not harnessed.
Second, our experimental data reveal that the extent of (judgmental) overconfidence,
i.e., providing too narrow confidence intervals, has a strong deteriorating effect on team
performance. Indeed, overconfident team members undermine performance, and overconfident team leaders have an even stronger deteriorating effect. For the selection of leaders
within organizations, this suggests that either overconfident leaders should be generally
avoided or that there is at least a trade-off between beneficial effects of a leader’s overconfidence (e.g., to foster coordination, Bolton et al. 2013, or to motivate team members,
Gervais and Goldstein 2007) and the negative effect on social learning. (Judgmental)
overconfidence may be partially domain-specific and state-dependent, but to some extent
it is a personality trait that can easily be assessed, e.g., in an assessment center in the
course of a selection procedure.
Third and finally, our paper makes a methodological contribution. By combining the
experiments on factual questions with the theories on social learning, we bridge between
neat theoretical frameworks and experimental set-ups that are less stylized (than those
used for pure theory testing). By building this bridge it becomes apparent that the
assumption of common knowledge about signal precision is problematic. Arguably, in
reality people do not know the signal precision of their interaction partners, but form
expectations about it, given what they know about this person and given how this person
“tagged” her piece of information with a level of confidence. (Judgmental) overconfidence,
as well as mistrust or anchoring effects, can lead to conservatism in updating, i.e., agents
incorporate new pieces of information less than theoretically predicted. Bolton et al.
(2013) further argue that other behavioral biases such as a selection bias in information
acquisition can also induce conservatism (what they call resoluteness). We incorporate
this idea into both naı̈ve and rational models of social learning and find that the model
fit of each model increases. This is informative for economic theory on naı̈ve and rational
social learning by opening a fruitful avenue for an empirically important model extension.
In particular, our simple extensions of the models alter the prediction that consensus
is reached or approached. Instead, they predict a persisting diversity of opinions, in
which each agent’s long-run opinion is “biased” in the direction of his initial opinion.
This qualitatively different prediction could be studied more generally and be tested in
follow-up experiments.

2

Experimental Design

In a nutshell, participants in this experiment were asked to answer the same knowledge
questions multiple times in a row. The team leader could observe the previous answers
of all team members, while the team members could only observe the previous answer of
6
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the team leader. Treatments differed by the selection criterion that determined the team
leader.
The experiment was conducted at the University of Hamburg and consisted of eleven
sessions with a total of 176 subjects.7 In each session, participants were randomly allocated into groups of four. The basic task was to answer a factual question individually
and to provide a level of confidence for the answer. The closer the estimate was to the
correct answer, the more it was honored by game points which were translated into actual
payouts, as detailed in Table C.4. On average, sessions lasted for one hour and participants earned 9.50 Euros, which was close to the norm of the lab. The maximum feasible
payout was 48.20, while the minimum was the show-up fee of 5 Euros. This fact was explicitly stated to the participants in order to highlight that the payout strongly depended
on individual performance. It was pointed out verbally and in the written instructions
that the use of mobile phones, smart phones, tablets, or similar devices would lead to
expulsion from the experiment and exclusion from all payments.
Each session consisted of two phases: A selection phase I and a decision phase II. In
the selection phase I, each participant answered eight different factual questions once. At
the end of the experiment, one of these questions was randomly selected to be payoffrelevant. In the decision phase II, there was another set of eight questions, each of which
was similar to one of the questions of the selection phase. For instance, there was a
question about voter turnout in both phases of the experiment. Similarly, there were two
questions about the share of water in certain vegetables. Questions related to diverse
topics and each question was already tested in previous experiments (Lorenz et al., 2011;
Rauhut and Lorenz, 2011; Moussaı̈d et al., 2013).8
In the decision phase II, each question had to be answered six times in a row, in a
sequence of six rounds. After each round, participants received feedback about the answers
and confidence statements provided by their group members according to a star network.
The center of the star network could observe the previous answers and confidence levels
of all four team members; the three pendants could only observe the previous answer and
confidence of the center, in addition to their own. For each question of phase II, only one
of the six rounds was selected at random by the end of the session to be payoff-relevant.
Hence, there was no possibility to “hedge” risk with a portfolio of answers.
The actual treatments differed by the procedure that determined who within a group
of four became the center of the star network for phase II. In the baseline treatment T0,
the center was selected at random. In the accuracy treatment T1, the center became the
group member whose guess on the similar question in phase I was closest to the correct
answer. In the confidence treatment T2, the center became the group member whose level
of confidence for the guess on the similar question in phase I was highest. Potential ties
7
8

A more detailed description of the experimental procedures can be found in Online Appendix C.
The full list of questions can be found in Online Appendix C.
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in accuracy or confidence were broken at random. Half of all groups played the random
treatment (T0) for four questions and the accuracy treatment (T1) for the other four
questions; the other half played the random treatment (T0) for four questions and the
confidence treatment (T2) for four questions. When the network for one question was
formed, the selection procedure was made transparent to the group members. In the
selection phase I, subjects did not know how decisions in the selection phase could have
an influence on the decision phase. Instructions for the first phase simply announced that
there would be a second phase with another set of instructions. This precluded strategic
behavior in phase I, e.g., to become the center or to avoid becoming the center in phase II.
While the answers to the questions were strongly incentivized, the confidence statements
were not directly incentivized. Hence, the statements of confidence in phase II can also
be considered as a mere communication technology. As we discuss in the next section,
among rational agents there are indeed incentives to communicate truthfully the level of
confidence in our setting in order to foster optimal learning in the group. However, our
experimental results will not rely on the assumption that the confidence statements are
truthful.

3

Theoretical Background

In this section, we derive theoretical predictions about the behavior in our experiment.
The set-up is as follows. Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4} be the agents in one team. Let 1 be the
center of the star network and 2, 3, 4 the pendants. The basic task in our experiment is
to provide guesses on a specific question, the answer of which is a fraction. There is an
unkown state of the world θ ∈ Θ, which is the correct answer to the question at hand.9
Denote by xi (t) the answer of agent i at time t. Denote by ci (t) the confidence statement
of agent i at time t. Time is discrete: t = 1, 2, ..., T , with T = 6 in phase II of the
experiment. Accurate guesses are incentivized by a payoff function π(ei (t)) that is weakly
decreasing in the distance to the true answer ei (t) = |θ − xi (t)|. One out of six answers
is finally drawn as payoff-relevant.
To make predictions about the participants’ guesses in phase II, we use two approaches:
a rational learning approach and a naı̈ve learning approach.

3.1

Rational Learning Approach: Bayesian Updating

In the rational learning approach, we assume that agents maximize expected payoffs given
their beliefs and that beliefs are formed by Bayes rule.
9

In the experiment, the correct answer is rounded and belongs to the finite set Θ
{0, 0.01, 0, 02, ..., 0.99, 1}, which we can also model as the interval Θ = [0, 1].

=
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Notice that a belief about the true answer is not a single number, but a probability
distribution over the possible states (fi (t) : Θ → R). In the first round of guessing,
t = 1, agents are endowed with some private information, i.e., what they know about
the question at hand before interacting in the team. In the second round, each pendant
i 6= 1 has observed the guess x1 (1) and the confidence statement c1 (1) of the center and
can use this to update his belief. The center, on the other hand, has observed all guesses
and confidence levels of the first round to form her belief, which is the basis for her
second-round guess x1 (2). If we assume that the guess and confidence level are sufficient
to reconstruct an agent’s belief and that the agents know how their private information
is interrelated, then the center is fully informed after the first round of guesses. In this
case, she can make the optimal guess x∗ := arg maxx∈Θ E[π(|θ − x|)|f1 (1), ..., f4 (1)], given
the pieces of information in the team. Since all agents have the same payoff function
and pendants can observe the center’s guess x1 (2) = x∗ , all agents make the same guess
xi (t) = x∗ from round 3 on. This observation leads to the following prediction.10
Prediction 1 (Bayes). In a model with common knowledge of rationality and common
priors, the following holds. If the answer and confidence statement of a linked team
member in a star network is sufficient fully to represent her private information, then
the center learns once and the pendants learn twice. (Learning refers here to information
updates and improvements in expectations.) Moreover, all team members will state the
optimal answer x∗ in any round t ≥ 3, independent of who is at the center of the star
network.
Prediction 1 states that the selection of the team leader does not matter for the performance of social learning, apart from the first two rounds (and, in fact, only apart from
round two). Moreover, it states that every agent states the payoff-maximizing guess, which
implies that social learning is “efficient” in the sense of maximizing the sum of expected
payoffs. However, several of its underlying assumptions deserve further attention.
First, a rational agent i is assumed to state the answer xi (t) that maximizes expected
payoff, given his belief. This holds at least in the last round t = 6. In earlier rounds, there
is potentially a strategic incentive to provide an answer that does not maximize expected
payoff of that round (in order to be able to provide a better answer in later rounds). In
fact, the earliest possibility to realize a deviating strategy is to deviate in round t = 1,
learn something about the reaction of others in round t = 2, and materialize the better
guess in round t ≥ 3. Since, under the assumptions above, each agent states the optimal
answer from round t = 3 on, strategic misrepresentation cannot pay off. There is simply
no room for improvement. The same argument applies to the strategic misrepresentation
of confidence statements. Hence, strategic misrepresentation is not an issue in our setting.
10

A formal statement of this result can be found in Online Appendix B. There we introduce the general
framework (B.1.1), prove the proposition (B.1.2), and provide two specific examples how such a rational
model unfolds in our setting (B.2.1).
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Second, it is explicitly assumed that statements of guesses and confidence levels are
sufficient to recover beliefs. For this to be satisfied, the agent must know the other’s
belief up to one or two parameters. This is satisfied, for instance, in models assuming
that beliefs follow a beta distribution.11 Bayesian models with weaker assumptions could
assume that agents also have beliefs about the signal quality of the others and imperfectly
learn over time both the available private signals as well as their quality. Given the result
by Aumann (1976), such a model is expected to lead to more learning iterations, but to
the same outcome in the long run.
Third, how exactly an agent updates depends on his higher order beliefs on how private
pieces of information are related to each other and how they are related to the truth. In
theoretical models, it is usually assumed that there is common knowledge about the prior
distribution of the true state, and about how private signals are drawn. In this experiment,
agents are confronted with real questions. Hence, the agents’ higher order beliefs about
their own and their fellow team members’ expertise can also depend on additional factors,
such as the particular question at hand or on the treatment. In particular, the accuracy
treatment T1, i.e., that the center gave the most accurate answer to a similar question,
or the confidence treatment T2, i.e., that the center was the most confident on a similar
question, might reveal something about the agent’s ability that could be considered in
the updating process. If anything, the declaration of the treatment T1 or T2 can reveal
additional information, which would lead to better guesses, compared to the random
treatment T0. To generate a prediction that is much more in line with the theoretical
models, Prediction 1 abstracts from this possibility by assuming that there is common
knowledge about how the private pieces of information are related to each other and to
the truth.12
Fourth and finally, the assumption of common knowledge of rationality need not be
satisfied. In sum, it cannot be expected that the requirements of Prediction 1 above
are fully satisfied in the experiment. Still, the Prediction 1 gives us a clean baseline to
compare the data with.

3.2

Naı̈ve Learning Approach: DeGroot Model

Previous experimental research on social learning has not always found strong support
for Bayesian learning, but often suggests that simple rules of updating, such as repeatedly taking averages, fit the data well (Corazzini et al., 2012; Grimm and Mengel, 2016;
Battiston and Stanca, 2014; Chandrasekhar et al., 2016). We use their common modeling approach, which is often named after Morris DeGroot, to generate an alternative
11

We study such models in Section B.2.1.
In the experiment, we did not induce a common prior because we used questions of real topics.
Nevertheless, we argue that models that assume a common prior and signals can contribute to our
understanding of social learning in real settings.
12
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prediction and to later specify models of more naı̈ve learning. The basic aspect of naı̈veté
incorporated in this modeling approach is that agents do not sufficiently account for the
origin of information such that pieces of information are used each time they reach an
agent through the network. This behavioral bias is also called “persuasion bias” (DeMarzo
et al., 2003).
In the DeGroot model, the way people average the former guesses in their network
neighborhood is typically constant. In the star network, this means that peripheral agents
always provide a guess that is a mixture between the center’s and their own last guess,
with constant weights gi1 and gii on the two, while the center mixes all answers with some
constant weights g11 , g12 , g13 , g14 , which are also positive and sum up to one. Given the
weights and the initial answers xi (1), all consecutive answers xi (t) are fully determined.
In particular, if G denotes the (row-stochastic) 4 × 4 matrix consisting of these entries
gij and zeros at the remaining entries, the agents’ updating can be written in vector and
matrix notation as x(t) = Gx(t−1). Hence, the predicted guesses are x(t) = Gt−1 x(1), for
t = 1, 2, .... Each agent thus generically changes guesses from round to round. Assuming
that averaging weights are strictly positive is sufficient for the conclusion that all agent’s
guesses xi (t) converge for t → ∞ to the same answer, which we denote by xi (∞). Given
that convergence is fast enough, xi (∞) is also a good prediction for xi (6). It can be shown
that, for any i,


1
g13
g14
g12
xi (∞) =
x2 (1) +
x3 (1) +
x4 (1) ,
(1)
1x1 (1) +
c
g21
g31
g41
12
13
with c = 1+ gg21
measure long-term influence of an agent
+ gg31
+ gg14
. The weights wi = 1c · gg1i
41
i1
i, which is called eigenvector centrality in network science since w0 G = w0 (e.g., Friedkin
1991, DeMarzo et al. 2003, Golub and Jackson 2010). As can be directly observed from
Equation 1, the center’s influence on the long-term answer is different from a pendant
i’s influence, as long as gg1i
6= 1. In particular, the center has a stronger influence if the
i1
center’s weight on the pendant g1i is lower than the pendant’s weight on the center gi1 .
This is a realistic assumption since pendants have only the center’s guess to update from,
while the center can distribute her weight among three pendants.
To discuss performance of social learning in this model type, we need to make assumptions about the relation between the initial guesses xi (1) and the truth θ, e.g., that
initial guesses are realizations of independent random variables that have the truth as
expected values. For any such probabilistic model and for any definition of the “optimal”
guess x̂ given the initial guesses, the approached value x(∞) and the optimal guess x̂ will
only coincide if by coincidence the averaging weights happen to be optimal in that sense.
The same holds true for the guesses and optimal guesses of early rounds, say round two.
Even if the weights gij happen to produce the optimal guess x̂ for some agent i in some
round t, they will not have this property for every agent and for every round. Hence,

11
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there is an inherent inefficiency in these naı̈ve models of social learning. The reason is
that initial guesses of some participants are incorporated in the change of answers more
frequently than other team members’ guesses, while guessing weights are constant. These
observations lead to the following prediction.13
Prediction 2 (DeGroot). In the naı̈ve model with constant and positive averaging weights,
the following holds. In a star network, every agent’s learning heavily depends on the
network structure, i.e., on who is the center. In particular, for gi1 > g1i , the center has
a larger influence on the long-run opinion than team member i. Generically, the center
updates more than once and the pendants update more than twice. Under weak conditions,
the first round of updating is learning (the expected error decreases), but for every notion
of what is the optimal answer, the team members will generally state suboptimal answers.
Prediction 2 states that the selection of the team leader heavily affects the performance of social learning, and that social learning is generally “inefficient” in the sense of
not maximizing any function that is decreasing in the error of an agent’s guess. Given
the weighting matrix G, the naı̈ve model is fully specified and provides a clear-cut prediction about all agents’ guesses in all rounds. Typical specifications of G are studied in
Section 5.3.
Our treatments T1 and T2 mainly affect naı̈ve social learning through the manipulation of the network structure (who is at the center), but potentially also through the
declaration of the treatments. The second channel would be present if the averaging
weights gij depended on this declaration. In the empirical analysis, we will disentangle
the effects of the manipulation of the center – which does not matter according to Prediction 1, but is crucial according to Prediction 2 – from potential effects of declaration
(which can only be helpful in the rational framework of Prediction 1, but could also be
harmful in the naı̈ve framework of Prediction 2).

4

Success of Social Learning

The two theoretical approaches lead to contradicting predictions. Therefore, it remains
an empirical question whether and how the selection of the leader affects the success of
social learning.

4.1

Performance over Time

We measure the quality of the final answers both on the individual and on the collective
level. On the individual level, we measure the quality by the error ei (t), which is the
13

A formal statement of this result can be found in Online Appendix B.1.3. There we introduce a
probabilistic framework and prove the proposition.
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absolute distance between answer xi (t) and truth θ. On the group level, we use two complementary measures. First, we measure the quality of the four answers by the collective
P
error, i.e., the error of the mean of the four answers in the group ce(t) = | 14 4i=1 xi (t)−θ|.
Indeed, given the four final answers by a group, a decision might be taken on the basis
of the mean of the four answers. Second, we consider whether the correct answer lies
within the interval that is spanned by the four answers, and if so, whether it also lies
within the interval that is spanned by the two answers which are contained in the interval
of the two other answers. We define the indicator variable (wisdom of ) crowd error as
follows: woce(t) = 0 if at most two answers are strictly below or strictly above the correct answer; woce(t) = 1 if three answers are strictly below or strictly above the correct
answer; and woce(t) = 2 if the correct answer lies strictly above or below all four answers
in the group. The crowd error measures the error made when assuming that the correct
answer lies between the given answers. For all three measures of performance, smaller
errors mean higher performance.
Figure 1 depicts the levels of these performance measures over time, distinguishing
by the three treatments. Panels A-C show that the individual errors are on average
between 10 and 20 percentage points from the true answer and tend to decrease over
time. More precisely, the pendants’ average error reduces three times significantly on
the five percent level. As intended in the accuracy treatment T1, selecting a center who
was most accurate in answering a similar question (in phase I) leads to centers who are
significantly better in estimating the current question in the first round (of phase II).
The centers’ average error reduces significantly once in the random treatment T0, as
well as in the confidence treatment T2, but never so in the accuracy treatment T1 (at
significance levels p < 0.05). By and large, these observations on the learning dynamics
are consistent with the predictions of the rational model, namely that pendants learn
twice and centers learn once. In particular, in the random treatment T0 the center
reduces her error drastically from the first round to the second without significant further
improvements, as the rational model would predict. Panels D-F show that the collective
errors are on average between 12 and 16 percentage points from the true answer and also
reduce over time. Similarly to the individual errors, the collective errors first decrease and
then seem to settle after a few rounds (at a point that is significantly greater than zero).
Taking these observations on individual and collective errors together, agents do learn
from each other, but most of learning takes place in the first and in the second round
of updating, i.e., until round t = 3.14 A similar pattern, albeit with a change of sign,
can be observed in panels G-I for the crowd error: The crowd error increases over time
14

Learning cannot stem from having more time to think about a question since participants of the
experiment who are not confronted with any information about the guesses and confidence of others did
not at all improve over time. We tested this possibility with participants of the experimental sessions
who were not exposed to any information. We randomly selected these subjects from all participants of
sessions whose number of participants was not divisible by four, the size of our groups.
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with most of its changes until round t = 3. This observation is consistent with findings
of Lorenz et al. (2011), who show that the exchange of opinions reduces the wisdom of
crowds. Crowd error is an indicator variable of which the averages have to be interpreted
correspondingly. For instance, in the random treatment T0, woce(6) is 1.57 on average,
which indicates that there are many cases (here: 65.9%) with a crowd error of two, and
very few cases (8.5%) with a crowd error of zero. Hence, in the final period the correct
answer most frequently lies outside of the convex hull of the provided answers.
Result 1. Individual and collective errors reduce over time. Centers learn once (except
in the accuracy treatment T1); pendants learn at least twice. Crowd errors increase over
time.

4.2

Treatment Effects on Performance

To test for treatment effects, we run regressions with the three error measures as the
dependent variables and with treatment dummies as the independent variables. We focus
our analysis on investigating the effects of learning on the final period, which is period 6.
The last period is the most relevant, since it is the last period up to which learning can
take place. In consecutive robustness analyses, we also analyze performance for earlier
rounds back to period t = 3, the first round in which full learning can theoretically take
place. Notice that the distribution of (individual and collective) errors is heavily skewed.
Taking the logarithm (e.g., log(ei (t) + 1)) in the regressions of individual and collective
errors gives less weight to errors which are far away from the truth and more weight to
errors close to the true answer, such that the analysis will not be driven by a few cases
in which errors were huge, say, forty and more. For the variable crowd error, which may
attain values 0, 1, and 2, we use ordered logit.
Table 1 reports these models when controlling for each treatment T1 and T2 with
a dummy variable, while T0 is the reference category. We control for the heterogeneity
between different questions by using dummy variables. If selecting the most accurate or
the most confident enhances performance, then we should see a significant negative effect
on the three errors. As Table 1 reveals, the accuracy treatment T1 does not outperform
the random treatment T0. The coefficients are insignificant and even positive. Even
more strikingly, the confidence treatment T2 underperforms compared with the random
treatment T0. The latter effect is significant on the 5-percent level for the individual error
and the crowd error, and significant on the 10-percent level for the collective error.
Result 2. Performance does not improve when the center is known to be the most accurate
(T1). Performance even deteriorates when the center is known to be the most confident
(T2).
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Figure 1: Individual, collective, and crowd errors over time by treatments. Panels A, B,
C differentiate between centers (black) and pendants (gray). All confidence intervals are
standard 95% confidence intervals.
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accuracy treatment (T1)

confidence treatment (T2)

intercept

(1)
(2)
(3)
individual error (log) collective error (log) crowd error
0.026
0.003
0.106
(0.49)
(0.03)
(0.40)
0.144∗
(2.44)

0.179
(1.80)

2.164∗∗∗
(33.40)

2.149∗∗∗
(17.77)

intercept cut 1
intercept cut 2
N

1.408

352

0.739∗
(2.39)

-2.555∗∗∗
(-6.76)
-0.830∗
(-2.51)
352

t statistics in parentheses
Question dummy coefficients for 8 questions not shown
Individual error: robust s.e. clustered for 176 subjects
Collective and crowd errors: robust s.e. clustered for 44 groups
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

Table 1: Treatment effects on final errors: log error, log collective error, and wisdom of
crowd error (in period 6). Linear regression (models 1 and 2) and ordered logit regression
(model 3).

16
http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper1227

18

Büchel et al.: The Strength of Weak Leaders - An Experiment on Social Influ

To understand the mechanism behind these treatment effects of selecting the most
accurate or the most confident agent as a center, we distinguish between two aspects of
each treatment, the trait of the central agent and the declaration of how the central agent
was selected. By our experimental design we can disentangle the two effects, since in the
random treatment T0 it frequently happens by chance that the most accurate agent was
selected as the center without having the declaration of her or his accuracy, as is the case
in the T1 treatment. The same applies for confidence; in a number of cases, the most
confident agent was randomly selected to be the center in the random treatment T0.
Table 2 reports the results of the regressions when we control for the trait that the
center is the most accurate or the most confident in the group, such that the treatment
dummies only pick up the declaration effect. When the center happens to be the most
confident or the most accurate, the outcome measures tend to improve, which can be seen
from the negative sign of the (non-significant) coefficients. When the confidence of the
center is declared to all group members, however, the performance is significantly reduced.
The results are qualitatively similar for accuracy of the center in the sense that the signs
of the effects are the same, but we cannot reject the null in that case, and the size of the
effects is also smaller than for confidence.
While Table 2 reports the effects for the final period after all learning has taken place,
Figure 2 illustrates robustness analyses of declaration effects when the regressions are run
for each period separately. We show periods 3 to 6, since these are the periods after which
full learning could happen and did take place according to the error dynamics (Figure 1).
A
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Figure 2: Treatment effects on errors: log error, log collective error, and wisdom of crowd
error (periods 3-6). Linear regressions, 95 % confidence intervals.
The effect of declaring that the center is the most confident consistently increases the
error measures and thus reduces performance. The declaration of accuracy has the same
tendency, but the effects are smaller and insignificant.
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accuracy-trait

(1)
(2)
(3)
individual error (log) collective error (log) crowd error
-0.110
-0.0716
-0.0477
(-1.88)
(-0.76)
(-0.15)

accuracy-declaration (T1)

0.117
(1.64)

0.0790
(0.60)

0.196
(0.57)

confidence-trait

-0.106
(-1.95)

-0.231∗
(-2.20)

-0.474
(-1.74)

confidence-declaration (T2)

0.218∗∗
(3.17)

0.335∗
(2.58)

1.053∗∗
(2.79)

intercept

2.221∗∗∗
(34.17)

2.241∗∗∗
(20.06)

intercept cut 1
intercept cut 2
N

1.408

352

-2.735∗∗∗
(-6.99)
-0.999∗∗
(-2.89)
352

t statistics in parentheses
Question dummy coefficients for 8 questions not shown
Individual error: robust s.e. clustered for 176 subjects
Collective and crowd errors: robust s.e. clustered for 44 groups
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

Table 2: Treatment effects on final errors: log error, log collective error, and wisdom of
crowd error (in period 6). Linear regression (models 1 and 2) and ordered logit (model
3).
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Result 3. Performance tends to improve when the center is the most confident. Declaration of confidence undermines performance.

4.3

Social Influence

To analyze why the selection of the center can have a negative impact on performance,
we study to which extent agents within a group influence each other. For this purpose
we regress the answer xi (t) of an agent i in time t ≥ 3 on his initial answer xi (1), as well
as on the initial answers of the other group members xj (1). In particular, a pendant’s
answer is regressed on the center’s initial answer, his own initial answer, and the mean of
the other two pendants’ initial answers. The center’s answer is regressed on the average
of the pendants’ initial answers.
Tables A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix report the influence weights when estimating them
separately for each treatment. For instance, in the random treatment T0, a pendant’s final
answer is estimated as the linear combination of its initial answer with weight 56.7%, the
center’s initial answer with weight 26.7%, and the other pendants’ average initial answer
with weight 16.6%. There are several interesting observations to make in these tables.
First, every agent places much weight to his own initial opinion. In the rational model
and the random treatment, we would expect that on average this weight is 25%.15 Second,
the weight individuals place on their own initial opinion depends on the treatment. In
the random treatment, pendants place more weight on themselves than in the other two,
while centers place less weight on themselves in the random treatment. Finally, the social
influence by the other team members heavily depends on the treatment. For pendants,
the center’s weight was 26.7% in the random treatment T0, but 46.9% in the confidence
treatment T2; and similarly in the accuracy treatment T1.
The two aspects of a treatment, the trait of the center and the declaration of the center,
are then captured by the interaction effects of the corresponding dummy variables with
the influence weights in the regressions that pool the three treatments. These regressions
are reported in Tables A.3 and A.4 in the Appendix. Their effects are illustrated in
Figure 3. A positive effect of a certain dummy variable means that the given influence
weight is increased by the given treatment.
When the center happens to be the most accurate or the most confident, but there is
no public declaration of this, then the pendants do not strongly respond (panel A); they
only mildly increase their weight on the center. In the same case, i.e., when the center
is the most accurate or confident, the center places significantly more weight on her own
initial opinion and, accordingly, significantly less weight on the pendants’ opinions (panel
B). In contrast, the declaration that the center is the most confident or accurate does
not affect the center’s weighting (panel D), but there is a strong effect on the pendants
15

We will return to this observation when extending the social learning models in section 5.1.
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Figure 3: Trait and declaration influence for pendants and centers. Gray accuracy, black
confidence treatments, 95 % confidence intervals.
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(panel C). Declaring that the center is somehow special (the most confident or accurate
on a similar question) significantly increases the pendants’ weights on the center’s initial
opinions.
Result 4. The pendants place more weight on a center who is declared to be the most
confident or the most accurate. The center places less weight on the pendants’ when she
is the most confident or the most accurate.
This result provides an explanation for the former results. Declaring that the center
is somewhat special increases the weight (s)he receives. Placing more weight to a single
opinion has a negative effect on performance, except if this person is substantially better
informed than the others. In the accuracy treatment T1, this condition is satisfied to
some extent, such that the negative effect of placing too much weight on a single person
and the positive effect of placing more weight on a person who is better informed may
balance each other. Consequently, the performance in the accuracy treatment T1 need
not differ from the random treatment T0. In the case of the confidence treatment T2, the
center is not substantially better informed than the other group members, as can be seen
from panel C in Figure 1. Hence, giving him/her more weight only has the negative effect
of insufficiently taking into account the information of the others. This is on average even
worse than the random treatment T0.

4.4

Overconfidence

As we have seen in Table 2 above, it is rather beneficial for the group when the center
happens to be most accurate or most confident, but is not declared as such. On the
other hand, it is well-known that many people are often overconfident, i.e., they report
much too small confidence intervals when asked about a region where they expect the true
answer with a certain probability (a usual way is to ask where they expect the answer in
90% of their guesses; see, e.g., Soll and Klayman (2004); Moore and Healy (2008); Herz
et al. (2014). In phase I of our experiment, we asked participants to provide such regions.
Therefore, we can compute for every participant her individual overconfidence score simply
by counting how often that person provided a confidence interval that did not contain
the true answer. Thus, every participant is characterized by an overconfidence score in
{0, 1, . . . , 8} with the interpretation that a person is the more overconfident the larger
her overconfidence score becomes. As Figure 4 reveals, many agents are overconfident.
Their guess should only lie in 10% of the cases outside of their provided 90% confidence
interval. However, for most agents this happens in more than two out of eight cases. The
histogram also documents that there is substantial heterogeneity in overconfidence.
In Table A.5 in the Appendix, we analyze how the center’s overconfidence score as
well as the sum of the pendants’ overconfidence scores impact the group’s performance
21
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Figure 4: Histogram of overconfidence. The value 0 means that a subject has specified for
all eight knowledge questions a respective 90% confidence interval which encloses the true
value. The value 8 means that a subject has specified for all eight knowledge questions a
90% confidence interval which does not enclose the true value. All values above 1 indicate
overprecision, since more than 10% of estimates fall out of the 90% confidence interval
(i.e., 91.5% of subjects are overconfident).

(on top of the previously found treatment effects): we find the corresponding regression
coefficients to be significantly positive for all three error measures (while the formerly
discussed effects remain). Moreover, the center’s coefficient is substantially larger than
the pendants’. We thus have the following result.
Result 5. Both the center’s and the pendants’ overconfidence undermine performance.
The center’s overconfidence has a more deteriorating effect than the pendants’ overconfidence.
Given this result, it is, ceteris paribus, best for the group’s performance if the most
overconfident group members are pendants, i.e., it would be best if the least overconfident
group member was the center. On the other hand, overconfidence is of course related
to confidence itself, and the most confident group member acting as center improves the
group’s performance when she is not declared to be the most confident. Indeed, Table A.5
reveals that, when controlling for overconfidence and for the declaration of confidence, the
trait of being the most confident significantly increases performance.
Thus, we conclude that the leader personality who should optimally be selected is
characterized as confident without being overconfident. Depending on the individual
characteristics, it can therefore be optimal to select someone who is not the most confident
agent, if the chosen agent can compensate by being very ‘tight’, i.e., not overconfident.
Hence, all results (Results 1-5) contribute to a coherent picture of how the selection of
the leader affects social learning. To investigate this interpretation further, in particular
22
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the one of placing “too much weight on the center” in the confidence treatment T2, we
analyze more in-depth the underlying micro-level mechanisms. In particular, we will study
the fact that weights on own opinions are too large, which also prevents optimal social
learning. As the social influence analysis showed, both pendants and centers generally
placed much weight on their own initial opinion. When studying the learning behavior in
the next section, we will incorporate this behavioral aspect.

5

Learning Behavior

The experimental data allow us to test theories of social learning on multiple levels. First,
their implications for the performance of social learning (as summarized in Prediction 1
and Prediction 2) are found to be consistent with some empirical results and inconsistent
with others. Second, we can directly take the theoretical models to the data and study
which aspects are in line with real behavior. For this purpose, we specify and vary
the models and measure which model specification best fits the data. We thus include
model variations that incorporate conservatism, a pattern that is commonly found in
experimental set-ups, but absent in any Bayesian model of social learning (that we are
aware of) and absent in almost all naı̈ve models of social learning.

5.1

Specification and Extension of Bayesian Models

To specify the rational models, we assume that each agent’s belief follows a beta distribution. This is a standard functional form for beliefs that live on intervals.16 With some
assumptions on the distribution of signals, all agents’ beliefs at any time indeed belong
to the class of beta distributions.17 Assuming conditional independence of initial signals,
Bayesian agents will state guesses that are convex combinations of their initial guesses.
The weight on these guesses, however, depends on the signal quality of each agent i,
which we denote by ni . The model variations that we study differ in the assumptions
about signal quality.
A baseline assumption is to suppose that the precision of each agent’s signal is the
same, i.e., ni = nj for all i, j. In that case, the optimal guess x∗ , which will be the
consensus from round t = 3 on, is simply the unweighted mean of the initial guesses xi (1).
We call this the Standard Model. Alternatively, agents are assumed to communicate their
belief fully by providing the guess and the confidence level. Then, for each answer xi (1)
and its confidence ci (1), the center can determine the two parameters of the corresponding
beta distribution and combine all initial beliefs in a rational manner, thereby updating
16

Like the normal distribution, which is a standard functional form for beliefs on the unbounded real
numbers, it is determined by two parameters only.
17
The formal framework is provided in section B.2 of the Online Appendix.
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leads to a combination of own and others’ guesses – not with equal weights, but with
larger weights for those guesses which are tagged by high confidence. We call this the
Sophisticated Model. Note that these are two opposing views on the informativeness of the
confidence statement – either confidence is fully informative or confidence can be ignored
– which lead to two models that both satisfy the requirements of Prediction 1, and are
hence similar in most respects. They differ in their weighting of initial information.
The previous empirical literature on real people’s beliefs and their updating finds two
very strong and consistent patterns: overprecision and conservatism.18 There is a simple
way to introduce both of them into our model: Agents overestimate their own signal
precision by a factor τi ≥ 1; respectively, they underestimate the signal precision of the
others by the inverse factor τ1i . The motivation of this model variant is that overconfident
agents suffer from overprecision in the sense that they perceive their signal as more precise
than it is.19
Formally, this is a generalization of the Standard Model and the Sophisticated Model.
This model also predicts that there are no more changes after t = 3. However, this model
does not predict consensus! The agents’ opinions settle down in between the prediction
of x∗ (i.e., the case τi = 1 for all i ∈ N ) and their initial guess xi (1). The weight of the
own initial guess is thereby increasing in overprecision τi . In particular, if τi → ∞, then
xi (t) → xi (1), i.e., infinitely overprecise agents are totally conservative and always stick
to their initial guess. (We will include such a model as a baseline and call it the Sticking
Model.)
To specify concrete models, we choose levels of overprecision τi that match with empirical results on overprecision. When asked for a 90% confidence interval, many people
provide a 50% confidence interval instead. This is roughly induced by τi = 5. Incorporating conservatism of every agent into the Standard Model or, respectively, into the
Sophisticated Model leads to the two models Standard-Plus Model and Sophisticated-Plus
Model. In the Standard-Plus Model, agents behave very similarly to the Standard Model,
but move only a fraction into the direction of the center, which corresponds to findings on
conservatism. The only difference to the Sophisticated-Plus Model is simply that we specify the initial signal precision not as equal, but according to the confidence statements.
Agents are assumed to know that others are overprecise and thus learn about the original
signals by correcting for τ .20
18

Overprecision, as it is called by Moore and Healy (2008), is also known as “judgmental overconfidence”
(Herz et al., 2014), “overconfidence in interval estimates” (Soll and Klayman, 2004), or “resoluteness”
(Bolton et al., 2013), and is defined as “excessive certainty regarding the accuracy of one’s belief.”
Conservatism means that agents are not willing to learn sufficiently from new signals (e.g., Peterson and
Beach (1967); Mobius et al. (2011); Ambuehl and Li (2014); Mannes and Moore (2013)). Of course, the
two patterns are closely related to each other.
19
Or, alternatively: agents learn from their neighbors, but they attach higher uncertainty to the beliefs
of others than to their own belief.
20
In the conservatism models (consisting of the specifications Standard-Plus and Sophisticated-Plus),
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Importantly, the four models Standard Model, Sophisticated Model, Standard-Plus
Model, and Sophisticated-Plus Model are all special cases of Bayesian models and hence
produce the prediction that is formalized as Prediction 1. Except that, in the StandardPlus Model and the Sophisticated-Plus Model, agents do not state the same guess x∗ from
round 3 on, but their subjectively perceived optimal guess x∗i , which is a mixture between x∗ and the agent’s initial guess xi (1). This difference is illustrated in Figure 5
below in the two left panels, which compare the dynamics of the Standard Model with
the Standard-Plus Model in a simple example.

5.2

Specification and Extension of DeGroot models

In the DeGroot framework of naı̈ve learning, agents approach consensus. Consensus is
given by x(∞) = w0 x(1), where the vector w captures the eigenvector centrality of the
agents (e.g., Friedkin (1991); DeMarzo et al. (2003); Golub and Jackson (2010)).
The most common specification is to allocate equal weights to any connection including
to oneself.


G=

1
 14
2

1
2
1
2

1
4
1
2

1
4

1
4


0 0

0 21 0 

1
0 0 2

Credit for this specification is usually given to DeMarzo et al. (2003). This behavior
corresponds to Bayesian updating with independent signals of equal precision in the first
round, but not in later rounds. The long-term prediction using this DeMarzo et al. Model
is determined by w = ( 25 , 51 , 15 , 15 )0 , i.e., pendants’ initial opinions enter the calculation of
the consensus with a weight of 20% each, while the center’s initial opinion accounts for
40% of the consensus.
Corazzini et al. (2012) suggest improving the DeMarzo et al. Model by increasing the
weight of agents who listen to many other agents (and show that this twist improves
the model fit to experimental data). The suggested specification is that the weights are
we make assumptions about higher-order beliefs that close the model in the sense that no agent will
expect another agent to behave in a different manner than in the one observed. In particular, we assume
that all agents think of all other agents as overprecise; and that all agents think that all agents think
that all agents are overprecise. In that way, an agent i is not surprised that j discounts i’s behavior from
i’s point of view (from a neutral point of view, j takes i’s behavior as he should) and that j overvalues
j’s guess (from i’s and a neutral standpoint).
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proportional to the outdegree (i.e., the number of agents listened to):


G=

1
 32
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1
0 0 4

This model predicts that the center of the star is even more influential in the long run:
9 2 2 2 0 21
w = ( 15
, 15 , 15 , 15 ) .
Incorporating conservatism requires a model extension. Friedkin and Johnsen (1990)
provide a more general model of naı̈ve learning. Initial opinions are determined by some
exogenous conditions, which can always have an impact on an agent’s opinion. Such a
model has also been analyzed in Golub and Jackson (2012). To incorporate this aspect,
we can simply let agents stick to their initial guess xi (1) to some extent α:
xi (t) = (1 − αi ) · Gx(t − 1) + αi · xi (1).
For αi = 0, we have the DeGroot model. For αi = 1, we have the simplest conceivable
model: an agent makes an initial guess xi (1) and then sticks to it. This is a baseline model
that we call the Sticking Model, as already mentioned when discussing totally overprecise
rational learners.
If αi ∈ (0, 1) for every agent i, then the model prediction is that agents move towards
the others’ guesses, but still rely on their initial guess. This is conservatism.22 Interestingly, with this model variation, the updating process converges without reaching a
consensus (for generic starting values).
We extend the DeMarzo et al. Model and the Corazzini et al. Model by the Friedkin
and Johnsen (1990) framework and set the conservatism/overprecision parameter α = 0.5.
This leads to the DeMarzo et al. Plus Model and the Corazzini et al. Plus Model. In these
models, agents do not approach consensus anymore. For instance, in the DeMarzo et al.
Plus Model, the long-term guess of a pendant i is a convex combination of initial guesses
1
with the following weights: weight 29 on the center’s initial guess, weight 27
on other
19
pendants’ initial guesses each, and weight 27 (≈ 70%) on the own initial guess, which
leads to different guesses of each pendant. This difference is illustrated in the right panels
of Figure 5. The long-term weights of the Corazzini et al. Plus Model are comparable, but
21

Grimm and Mengel (2016) propose another specification of the DeGroot weights. However, their extension does not lead to an additional prediction here because weights depend on the clustering coefficient,
which is zero for all agents in the star network.
22
Interpretations for the cause of conservatism include forms of overprecision or kinds of anchoring
bias in which the initial guess serves as anchor and the adjustments to the others’ guesses is limited by
parameter α.
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Figure 5: Simple examples of dynamics with time on the x-axis and answers (in percentage
points) on the y-axis. Upper panels illustrate two prominent models from the literature;
lower panels illustrate their extensions when conservatism is incorporated. Standard Model
is upper left, Standard-Plus Model is lower left, DeMarzo et al. Model is upper right, and
DeMarzo et al. Plus Model is lower right panel. Hence the left panels illustrate rational
models, the right panels naı̈ve models.

differ in that each agent, including the center, is more heavily influenced by the center’s
initial opinion.
Four models are illustrated in Figure 5. In this example, initial answers are x1 = 20%
for the center, and x2 = 40%, x3 = 60%, and x4 = 80% for the pendants. The most important differences are easily observable. In Bayesian models (left panels), learning stops
in round 3; in naı̈ve models (right panels), answers converge. In the specifications without
conservatism/overprecision (upper panels), agents reach or converge to consensus; in the
models with conservatism/overprecision (lower panels), there is a persistent heterogeneity of answers, such that each agent’s answer is “biased” towards the own initial answer.
Note that the conservative/overprecise agents in the naı̈ve models behave similarly to
conservative/overprecise agents in the rational learning approach.

5.3

Comparison of Models (Horse Race)

In total, we have specified nine models. Four following from the rational approach to
social learning, four following from the naı̈ve approach to social learning, and one baseline
27
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model (the Sticking Model ), which is a degenerate special case of both model classes. We
implemented each model such that all periods t ≥ 2 are predicted from values at t = 1.
We assess the fit of each model by measuring the root of the mean squared error (RMSE)
between the model predictions for t ≥ 2 and the data points. Figure 6 displays the results.
The worst overall model fit is obtained by the baseline model, in which all agents
stick to their initial guess (Sticking Model ). The best model fit is obtained by the “Plus”
models, which incorporate conservatism. In fact, every model considered has a larger
RMSE than its “Plus” counterpart that incorporates conservatism.
Considering the model fit for each round separately, the conservatism aspect seems
particularly helpful in predicting the first updates (round 2). Hence, the “Plus” models
fit much better than the others in these early periods. However, in the last period, the
“Plus” models fit best still, with the only exception that the DeMarzo et al. Model fits
better than the Sophisticated-Plus Model. This observation indicates that the advantage
of the models that include conservatism is not restricted to the first rounds, but resists.
Ignoring the “Plus” models for one moment, we can see that the naı̈ve learning in
the DeMarzo specification fits well to the data. The sophisticated specification of the
rational model does not fit to the data. The standard specification of rational learning
and the Corazzini specification of the naı̈ve learning are somewhere in between. Hence,
the straightforward specifications that treat all agents symmetrically (Standard Model,
DeMarzo et al. Model ) are at least as adequate as the specifications that incorporate
confidence statements in a specific way (Sophisticated Model ), or that incorporate the
unequal degree (Corazzini et al. Model ).
Adding conservatism to the models leads to a very good fit of the rational model
in its standard specification (Standard-Plus Model ) and a better fit of the sophisticated
specification (Sophisticated-Plus Model ) than without conservatism. The best model fit
is obtained for the naı̈ve models with conservatism (Corazzini et al. Plus Model and
DeMarzo et al. Plus Model ).
We can also differentiate the model fit by treatment. The results are illustrated in
Figure A.1 in the Appendix. The best model fit in the random treatment T0 is obtained
for both the DeMarzo et al. Plus Model and the Standard-Plus Model with an RMSE of
7.88. Hence, these extensions of straightforward specifications of the naı̈ve and the rational
approach best predict the experimental data in the baseline treatment. Comparisons are
similar across treatments. However, the Corazzini et al. Model fits better in the accuracy
T1 and confidence treatment T2 than in the random treatment T0. The reason is that the
center receives a high influence weight in the accuracy and confidence treatment T2, as
well as in the Corazzini et al. Model specification. Complementarily, the baseline model
of sticking to the initial guess fits much better in the random treatment T0 than in the
others. This is a clear indication that social influence is weakest in the random treatment
T0 and stronger in the accuracy treatment T1 and the confidence treatment T2. Given
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Figure 6: Root mean squared errors (RMSE) of social learning models. “Standard” and
“Sophisticated” are models of rational learning; “DeMarzo” and “Corazzini” are models
of naı̈ve learning. “Plus” models incorporate conservatism. Lower errors mean better fit
between model and data.
that social influence can undermine the wisdom of crowds (Lorenz et al., 2011), this is an
explanation for our result that the crowd error is lowest under the random leader T0.
We finally differentiate between the model fit for the center and for the pendants.
The result is displayed in Figure A.2 in the Appendix. The Corazzini et al. Model, which
predicts an immense influence of the center, fits well for the center, but not for the
pendants. Again, the “Plus” models fit well generally for both pendants and centers. The
best fit for the pendants is attained by the Corazzini et al. Plus Model, and the best fit
for the center is attained by the Standard-Plus Model.
Result 6. Incorporating “conservatism” into both the rational and naı̈ve models of social
learning increases the fit between theoretical models and empirical data.
The result holds for all four considered models, for all three treatments, for all rounds,
and, apart from one exception, for both centers and pendants. The exception is that the
Corazzini et al. Model predicts the center’s opinion better than the Corazzini et al. Plus
Model. Hence, our data strongly indicate that the extension of both the rational and the
naı̈ve models of social learning by conservatism is not a mere theoretical exercise, but an
empirically relevant generalization.
In sum, the results of the horse race show, first of all, that both models of rational and
models of naı̈ve learning can contribute to our understanding of social learning in teams.
Second, the baseline model that each agent sticks to his own initial guess and keeps his
independent opinion fits much better to the data when the team leader was selected at
random. Complementarily, models that predict an immense weight of the team leader’s
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opinion (Corazzini et al. Model ) fit well when the leader is known to be the most confident
(T2) or most accurate (T1).
Finally, the known models of social learning might fall short of covering the substantial
amount of conservatism that is characteristic for the social learning of real people. Assuming that people are overprecise provides a foundation for conservative learning, even
for rational learners, and affects the model prediction such that they are much closer to
our data. We can connect this observation with Result 5 that overconfident leaders undermine social learning. Assuming that agents are overprecise induces conservative learning
in which the opinions of others are not sufficiently accounted for. Therefore, overconfident
leaders undermine performance.

6
6.1

Discussion
Summary and Conclusions

An organization’s fit to the environment depends on the management’s ability to assess the
state of the – usually dynamic – environment and to cope with uncertainty. We measure
team performance in this respect by assessing its ability to estimate correct answers to
factual questions.
Having a team leader who is knowledgeable or confident in a given topic might in
principle be helpful. However, communicating the leader’s qualities can undermine this
effect. Stressing the expertise or confidence of the leader triggers other team members
to put too much weight on the leaders’ opinion. This narrows the opinion space and
diminishes the wisdom of the group substantially. Past accuracy (T1) and actual ability
are correlated such that there is a positive effect of an accurate leader, which, however,
is immediately undermined by the effect of declaring it. Confidence (T2) is only weakly
correlated with actual ability such that the net effect is significantly negative.
In addition to a negative effect of declaring the selection criteria of leaders, we can show
that most people are overconfident in their estimates and in their assessments of problems.
Overconfidence leads to ignorance of the others’ valuable opinions, information gets lost,
and the team’s potential for solving problems deteriorates. While overconfidence of every
team member has a deteriorating effect, the leader’s overconfidence has the strongest
negative effect.
These are two detrimental effects of leaders selected by confidence. We can further
show the micro-mechanisms of these detrimental effects by simulating different classes
of learning models. In particular, rational learning models in which social learning is
efficient, independent of the team leader, fall short of explaining our data. A better fit is
obtained for naı̈ve learning models that predict that the leader is more influential than any
other team member. Among those, the model that gives tremendous weight to the leader
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(Corazzini et al. Model ) does not fit well in the random treatment T0, but particularly well
in the treatments T1 and T2, in which the leader is not selected at random. Compared to
all models, people tend to adapt too little to the others’ opinions and are too confident in
their own subjective estimates. To introduce this pattern in the theory of social learning,
we extend both rational and naı̈ve models by conservatism, which can be derived from
overconfidence. With this twist, the fit of each model to the data increases substantially.
Moreover, this kind of bounded rationality leads to the fact that leaders learn too little
from the opinions in their network.
One conclusion from our paper is that we provide evidence for the superiority of a selection procedure that is based on random leader selection (“sortition”). This mechanism
has its roots in ancient Greece and has been discussed by various names such as “demarchy” or “aleatory democracy” (Zeitoun et al., 2014; Frey and Osterloh, 2016). While
there have been discussions in the literature about the advantages and disadvantages of
aleatory democracy, there is hardly empirical evidence. Our empirical results demonstrate that random selection can be beneficial compared to selection based on confidence.
Selection by confidence often leads to detrimental effects of truth-finding, since first the
leader listens too little to other members of the group and second the other members
listen too much to the leader. Our experiment is one of the first to shed light on one of
the potential mechanisms of why aleatory democracy may be beneficial. The strength of
random selection is not restricted to reducing the probability of overconfident leaders. It
is also based on the fact that the leader’s influence on team members is not amplified and,
therefore, the others’ opinions are respected more compared to a system in which leaders
push their own views on all team members due to both a central position in the communication network and an additional legitimacy because they are selected by expertise, or
even worse, by confidence.
The problem of overconfidence of leaders and its detrimental effects on group wisdom
becomes even more important when considering that expertise is often hard to measure in
reality. In fact, publicly expressed subjective confidence in the own expertise might sometimes be more important for becoming a leader than objective expertise. The problem is
that the truth is often not precisely known. Therefore, publicly expressed confidence may
persuade others that the person in question may know the correct answers. However, as
our experiment shows, when confidence and expertise are not strongly correlated, overly
confident leaders can mislead the group. This difficulty in assessing the true expertise for
selecting leaders may therefore be another argument for the beneficial empirical effects of
aleatory democracy, where the leaders are selected at random.
In our experiment, we focus on the team’s ability to converge to correct assessments of
the environment, which is to adapt and learn from each other such that they find correct
answers to factual questions. However, in addition to correct problem-solving, another
goal of teams is to foster cohesion, e.g., to strengthen their corporate identity. Sometimes,
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it is less important to find the truth, but more important to converge towards a common
opinion. Having a common opinion helps to reduce conflicts, work on the same tasks, and
help each other. This means that opinion convergence can be a separate, distinct goal of
teams and those leaders may be preferable who manage to unify the opinion space in their
team. Our experiment only focuses on the goal of finding correct answers. How to foster
coordination, opinion convergence, and cohesion is another goal. For example, it has been
shown that a leader’s overconfidence or resoluteness can foster coordination and cohesion
(Bolton et al., 2013). In their theoretical contribution, Bolton et al. (2013) already point
to the trade-off that an overconfident leader, while having positive effects for coordination,
has the downside of not sufficiently learning from the followers. We can now strengthen
and empirically document the second mechanism: overconfidence of leaders is clearly a
detrimental factor to the team’s learning. Hence, the strength of overconfident leaders
for coordination comes at the downside of suboptimal information-processing. When it
comes to tasks which are related to truth-finding, we claim that overconfident (or resolute)
leaders are actually harmful.

6.2

Limitations

The strength of our experimental design comes at the expense of certain limitations. First,
the external validity of this type of experiments depends on whether the interaction among
participants (who were virtually all university students) are similar to the interaction
among members of real teams in organizations. Moreover, we focus on the organizational
task to estimate the state of the environment, while other aspects also matter for the
performance of an organization. At the same time, this is a strength of our experimental
set-up, since we can isolate the performance in a key task: estimating the state of the
environment.
We have exogenously varied the selection criterion of the leader. This takes the perspective of the top management, deciding about, e.g., the promotion criteria of more and
less senior employees of the organization. It would also be interesting to see how team
members themselves would choose a selection criterion if they were given the opportunity
to choose.
By studying star networks, we have not varied the network architecture, but only the
network positions, which for star networks boils down to the question of who is the leader.
Follow-up research might include a variety of network architectures. This is beyond the
scope of this paper because it would shift the emphasis from the selection of the team
leader to the selection of a communication architecture within an organization. Formal
hierarchies within organizations usually have a star-like structure, e.g., they determine
the head of an organizational unit, or the president of a certain committee, which can be
directly modeled by star networks. However, since informal networks within organizations
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are also known to be important, alternative network architectures and even endogenous
network formation should be considered in future research.23
Finding that overconfidence is an important determinant of social learning suggests an
alternative treatment that combines accuracy and confidence to overconfidence, in which
leaders are selected based on their relatively low or high level of overconfidence. This
seems an interesting extension that, however, does not match real selection procedures we
are aware of. This could be considered an innovative suggestion to assess overconfidence
when selecting managers. Our treatments T1 accuracy and T2 confidence resemble real
selection criteria based on maximal competence, which are either objectively assessed (T1
accuracy) or subjectively provided by self-declaration (T2 confidence).
Finally, our experimental design focuses on social learning and does not mix it with
the decision-making process. After learning took place in a team, there are various forms
of how a decision is actually made. It could be the case that the team communicates its
opinions to the higher level management or their client, who then draw their conclusions
and take actions. It could also be that the team takes actions on its own, deciding, e.g.,
by the majority rule or with unanimity about the consequences. Obviously, decisionmaking processes also affect the quality of the decisions and are thus important to study.
However, studying them jointly with the social learning process can distort the measures
of learning since communication before collective decisions makes strategic considerations
in the communication stage prevalent.

6.3

Practical implications

Our findings suggest several practical implications. First, when selecting a leader, there
is a substantial difference between assessing a candidate’s competence by some tests (as
in our accuracy treatment T1) versus relying on her subjective statement of her own competence (as in our confidence treatment T2). This even holds when there are no strategic
incentives to misrepresent the own opinion and the own competence. Our findings clearly
suggest, whenever possible, focusing on objective measures of competence rather than
trusting subjectively stated confidence in candidates’ own expertise. A large majority of
people is overconfident, such that starting a competition as to who is claiming the highest
confidence will most likely lead to detrimental effects in selecting leaders who will listen
too little to other opinions in their network. Hence, when the main goal of the team is
related to truth-finding, this is expected to be a poor selection criterion.
Second, the way the selection criterion for the leader is communicated to a team heavily
affects the team’s interaction and performance. In particular, making explicit that the
team leader was selected at random can lead other team members to make use of their
23

In a quite different framework, endogenous network structures and social learing in organizations
have been studied by Çelen and Hyndman (2012).
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own valuable knowledge instead of “blindly” following their leader. By the hierarchical
structure, which determines the communication network, the team leader is already very
powerful and her opinion is certainly heard. Declaring that the team leader was selected
because of her (alleged) superiority increases her power, which might push team learning
out of balance. Hence, keeping quiet about the (alleged) superiority of a team leader can
foster more efficient learning within a team.
Third, we can validate that communication and social influence can be harmful for
the wisdom of crowds effect (Lorenz et al., 2011). We confirm this finding for unequal
communication structures in terms of star networks, where all people are connected to
a single center, who receives all information from the network while the others have to
communicate via the center. In particular, we show that the wisdom of crowd error
increases over time, giving evidence that the group can exploit less and less information
from other network members over consecutive periods of social influence. However, and
importantly, we also show that social influence can foster social learning. In particular,
the individual error and the collective error improve over time. Crucially, the effect of
social influence on performance is moderated by the selection criterion of who is in the
powerful position in the communication network, and by the declaration of the selection
criterion. In conclusion, if teams want to utilize the wisdom of crowds within their team,
they should admit interaction and opinion exchange, but prevent single individuals from
becoming overly influential.
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A

Appendix: Additional Tables and Figures
(1)
(2)
(3)
T0 random: answer 6 T1 accuracy: answer 6 T2 confidence: answer 6
0.567∗∗∗
0.405∗∗∗
0.392∗∗∗
(13.70)
(9.35)
(7.87)

own weight (pendant)

center’s weight

0.267∗∗∗
(8.82)

0.449∗∗∗
(12.72)

0.469∗∗∗
(14.13)

other pendants’ weight

0.166∗∗∗
(5.95)
528

0.146∗∗∗
(3.78)
264

0.139∗∗
(3.14)
264

N
t statistics in parentheses
robust s.e. clustered subjects
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

Table A.1: Influence weights on pendants’ final answer, separately estimated for each
treatment. Regression of the pendant’s final answer (period 6) on the initial answers
(period 1). Coefficients forced to sum up to one.
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Figure A.1: Root mean squared errors (RMSE) of social learning models differentiated
by treatment. Lower errors mean better fit between model and data.

35
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2018

37

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 1227 [2018]

(1)
(2)
(3)
T0 random: answer 6 T1 accuracy: answer 6 T2 confidence: answer 6
own weight (center)
0.473∗∗∗
0.659∗∗∗
0.705∗∗∗
(8.80)
(9.91)
(10.68)
0.527∗∗∗
(9.79)
176

pendants’ weight
N

0.341∗∗∗
(5.13)
88

0.295∗∗∗
(4.47)
88

t statistics in parentheses
robust s.e. clustered for 176 subjects
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

Table A.2: Influence weights on center’s final answer, separately estimated for each treatment. Regression of the center’s final answer (period 6) on the initial answers (period 1).
Coefficients forced to sum up to one.

RMSE by Center
Pendants

Center

11.26

8.14

9.36

9.08

8.22

8.74

8.62

8.93

9.24

10.06

8.15

DeMarzo Plus

Corazzini Plus

Standard Plus

DeMarzo

Sophisticated Plus

8.22

11.44

Corazzini

11.06

10.59

10.06

Standard

11.47

12.07

Sophisticated

Sticking

Figure A.2: Root mean squared errors (RMSE) of different models by center and pendants
differentiated by center and pendants. Lower errors mean better fit between model and
data.

36
http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper1227

38

Büchel et al.: The Strength of Weak Leaders - An Experiment on Social Influ

own weight (pendant)

(1)
pendant’s answer 6 (last period)
0.577∗∗∗
(12.05)

center weight

0.244∗∗∗
(6.81)

other pendants weight

0.198∗∗∗
(5.31)
-0.0234
(-0.41)

accuracy-trait × own
accuracy-trait × center

0.0693
(1.69)

accuracy-trait × other pendants

-0.0393
(-0.90)
-0.140
(-1.90)

accuracy-declaration (T1) × own
accuracy-declaration (T1) × center
accuracy-declaration (T1) × other pendants
confidence-trait × own

0.120∗
(2.33)
0.0222
(0.40)
-0.00712
(-0.14)

confidence-trait × center

0.0317
(0.79)

confidence-trait × other pendants

-0.0516
(-1.15)
-0.152∗
(-2.37)

confidence-declaration (T2) × own
confidence-declaration (T2) × center
confidence-declaration (T2) × other pendants
N

0.169∗∗∗
(3.39)
0.0407
(0.80)
1.056

t statistics in parentheses
robust s.e. clustered for 176 subjects
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

37 answer. Linear regression of the pendant’s
Table A.3: Influence weights on pendant’s final
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(1)
center’s answer 6 (last period)
0.400∗∗∗
(6.23)

own weight (center)

0.643∗∗∗
(9.76)
0.158∗
(2.45)

pendants weight
accuracy-trait × own

-0.147∗
(-2.09)
0.0402
(0.44)

accuracy-trait pendants
accuracy-declaration (T1) × own
accuracy-declaration (T1) × pendants
confidence-trait × own

-0.0393
(-0.38)
0.139∗
(2.05)
-0.189∗∗
(-2.70)
0.108
(1.44)

confidence-trait × pendants
confidence-declaration (T2) × own
confidence-declaration (T2) × pendants
N

-0.0353
(-0.42)
352

t statistics in parentheses
robust s.e. clustered for 176 subjects
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

Table A.4: Influence weights on center’s final answer. Linear regression of the center’s
final answer (period 6) on the initial answers (period 1)
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accuracy-trait

(1)
(2)
(3)
individual error (log) collective error (log) crowd error
-0.0989
-0.0589
0.0143
(-1.70)
(-0.62)
(0.05)

accuracy-declaration (T1)

0.108
(1.56)

0.0709
(0.56)

0.185
(0.55)

confidence-trait

-0.136∗
(-2.23)

-0.264∗
(-2.37)

-0.695∗
(-2.38)

confidence-declaration (T2)

0.238∗∗∗
(3.36)

0.355∗
(2.65)

1.215∗∗
(2.93)

overprecision center

0.0426∗∗
(2.76)

0.0453∗
(2.05)

0.216∗∗∗
(3.32)

overprecision pendants (sum)

0.0268∗∗
(3.04)

0.0268
(1.83)

0.102
(1.92)

intercept

1.696∗∗∗
(10.84)

1.706∗∗∗
(7.43)

intercept cut 1
intercept cut 1
N

1.408

352

-0.637
(-0.70)
1.154
(1.33)
352

t statistics in parentheses
Question dummy coefficients not shown
Individual error: robust s.e. clustered for 176 subjects
Collective and crowd errors: robust s.e. clustered for 44 groups
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

Table A.5: Treatment effects on final errors: log error, log collective error and wisdom of
crowd error (in period 6). Linear regression (models 1 and 2) and ordered logit regression
(model 3).
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Çelen, Boğaçhan and Shachar Kariv. 2005. “An experimental test of observational learning
under imperfect information.” Economic Theory 26:677–699.
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Supplementary Online Material
This supplementary online material belongs to the paper “The Strength of Weak Leaders
– An Experiment on Social Influence and Social Learning in Teams” by Berno Buechel,
Stefan Klößner, Martin Lochmüller, & Heiko Rauhut. It consists of the following sections:
B Mathematical Appendix
B.1 Appendix for Section 3
B.2 Appendix for Section 5.1
C Details of the Experimental Design
D Instructions

B
B.1
B.1.1

Mathematical Appendix
Appendix for Section 3
Theoretical Framework

The uncertainty is described by a probability space (Ω, F, P ), with Ω being the set of
all states of nature, F being the σ-algebra of events, and P being a probability measure
on F. For state of nature ω ∈ Ω, the correct answer to the question is denoted by θ(ω),
i.e., θ is a random variable on (Ω, F, P ). When the team members are confronted with
the question, every team member i is equipped with some information set describing i’s
knowledge about the true state of nature, Fi (0), with i = 1, 2, 3, 4 denoting the four team
members. Thereby, Fi (0), technically a sub-σ-algebra of F, contains all those events of
which team member i knows at time t = 0 for sure whether they have occurred or not.
Building only on the information available to them at time t = 0, all team members
then state their guesses on the correct answer: we denote these answers at time t = 1 by
Xi (1) (i = 1, 2, 3, 4): the fact that team member i can only make use of the information
contained in Fi (0) technically translates into Xi (1) being a random variable which must be
Fi (0)-measurable. Additionally, at time t = 1, team member i also provides information
about the confidence level associated with Xi (1): this confidence statement will be denoted
by Ci (1), technically it is also a Fi (0)-measurable random variable.
After the team members have stated their answers and confidence levels at time t =
1, the team leader learns about the other team members’ answers, X2 (1), X3 (1), and

1
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X4 (1), as well as their confidence levels, C2 (1), C3 (1), and C4 (1).1 Thus, the team leader
can update by combining the initial information, F1 (0), and the observed answers and
confidence levels of the other team members to build
F1 (1) := σ (F1 (0), X2 (1), X3 (1), X4 (1), C2 (1), C3 (1), C4 (1)) .2
Similarly, the non-central team members can update their information, however, they
only observe the answer and confidence level stated by the team leader:
Fi (1) := σ (Fi (0), X1 (1), C1 (1)) , i = 2, 3, 4.
Again, all team members i now state their answers, Xi (2), and confidence levels, Ci (2).
When stating these, team members can only build on the information set Fi (1), which
however in general is larger than Fi (0), thus the answers and confidence levels stated at
time t = 2 may well differ from those stated at time t = 1.
After the answers and confidence levels at time t = 2 have been stated, the team
leader again observes what the other team members have stated, which can be used for
updating information:
F1 (2) := σ (F1 (1), X2 (2), X3 (2), X4 (2), C2 (2), C3 (2), C4 (2))
= σ((F1 (0), Xi (τ ), Ci (τ ), i = 2, 3, 4, τ = 1, 2) .
Similarly, the non-central team members can update their information, using the team
leader’s stated answer and confidence level:
Fi (2) := σ (Fi (1), X1 (2), C1 (1)) = σ (Fi (0), X1 (τ ), C1 (τ ), τ = 1, 2) , i = 2, 3, 4.
Yet again, all team members i now state their answers, Xi (3), and confidence levels,
Ci (3). When stating these, team members can only build on the information set Fi (2),
which however in general is larger than Fi (1), thus the answers and confidence levels stated
at time t = 3 may differ from those stated at time t = 2. Afterwards, information updating
takes place again, and the process of updating and stating answers and confidence levels
goes on. Formally, this can described by Xi (t) and Ci (t) being Fi (t − 1)-measurable for
all team members i = 1, 2, 3, 4 and all times t = 1, . . . , 6, and
F1 (t) := σ (F1 (t − 1), X2 (t), X3 (t), X4 (t), C2 (t), C3 (t), C4 (t))
= σ((F1 (0), Xi (τ ), Ci (τ ), i = 2, 3, 4, τ = 1, . . . , t)
1

In this mathematical appendix we use capital letters to indicate random variables.
σ(·) denotes the result of combining information, technically, it is the smallest sub-σ-algebra of F
with respect to which all combined information is measurable.
2

2
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as well as
Fi (t) := σ (Fi (t − 1), X1 (t), C1 (t)) = σ (Fi (0), X1 (τ ), C1 (τ ), τ = 1, . . . , t) , i = 2, 3, 4
for all times t = 1, . . . , 6.
Using a payoff function, Π, which is decreasing in its argument, team member i’s guess
at time t, Xi (t), is awarded by Π(|θ − Xi (t)|). In the end, the actual payoff is determined
by randomly choosing the payoff belonging to one of the six answers, i.e., the payoff equals
Π(|θ − Xi (1)|), . . . , Π(|θ − Xi (6)|), each with a probability of 1/6.
B.1.2

Rational Models of Learning

Rational approaches assume that team members maximize their expected payoff. According to rational models, team member i will choose Xi (1), . . . , Xi (6) and Ci (1), . . . , Ci (6)
such that the expected payoff
6

1X
E (Π(|θ − Xi (t)|))
6 t=1
becomes as large as possible.
First, we state an almost trivial lemma about the maximal amount of information the
team members can collect.
Lemma B.1. Information acquisition in the team is bounded, no team member can learn
more than the combination of all team members’ initial information, technically:
Fi (t) ⊆ σ (F1 (0), F2 (0), F3 (0), F4 (0)) =: F(0).
We now discuss how the team leader is expected to behave under rational models of
learning.
Proposition B.1.
1. If the information contained in the pendants’ first-round answers
and confidence statements allows the team leader to get to know all of the information contained in the pendants’ initial information that is important with respect
to the correct answer, then the team leader will give the same, optimal answer in
rounds 2 through 6. Formally,
if P (θ|σ(F1 (0), Xi (1), Ci (1), i = 2, 3, 4)) = P (θ|F(0)) ,
then X1 (t) =

E (Π (|θ − X|)) for t = 2, . . . , 6.

arg max
XF (0)−measurable

3
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This is in particular fulfilled if the team leader is able to completely infer the maximally available information, F(0), from the other team members’ first round answers
and confidence statements, i.e., if σ(F1 (0), Xi (1), Ci (1), i = 2, 3, 4) = F(0).
2. If P (θ|σ(F1 (0), Xi (1), Ci (1), i = 2, 3, 4)) = P (θ|F(0)) (as in ’1.’), then the team
leader’s optimal behavior is to give the answers X ∗ :=
arg max
E (Π (|θ − X|))
XF (0)−measurable

in rounds t = 2, . . . , 6 and

E (Π (|θ − X|)) in the first round.

arg max
XF1 (0)−measurable

Proof.

1. Because of Lemma B.1, the team leader can never give an answer better than
E (Π (|θ − X|)) .

arg max
XF (0)−measurable

On the other hand, given that
P (θ|σ(F1 (0), Xi (1), Ci (1), i = 2, 3, 4)) = P (θ|F(0)) ,
the team leader can form this conditional expectation at times t = 2, . . . , 6, because
it can be formed when knowing F1 (0), X2 (1), X3 (1), X4 (1), C2 (1), C3 (1), and C4 (1).
2. The statement for rounds 2 through 6 has already been proven in ’1.’, and the statement for the first round follows from the same reasons. As this strategy separately
P
maximizes each of the terms in the expected payoff, 16 6t=1 E (Π(|θ − X1 (t)|)), it is
the optimal strategy for the team leader.

We now discuss how the pendants are expected to behave under rational models of
learning.
Proposition B.2.
1. If, from the team leader’s answers and confidence statements in
the first two rounds, pendant i can learn everything that is relevant with respect to
the correct answer, then pendant i will state the optimal answer in rounds 3 through
6. Formally,
if P (θ|σ(Fi (0), X1 (1), C1 (1), X1 (2), C1 (2))) = P (θ|F(0)) ,
then Xi (t) =

E (Π (|θ − X|)) for t = 3, . . . , 6.

arg max
XF (0)−measurable

This is in particular fulfilled if pendant i is able to completely infer the maximally
available information, F(0), from the team leader’s first and second round answers
and confidence statements, i.e., if σ(Fi (0), X1 (1), C1 (1), X1 (2), C1 (2)) = F(0).
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2. If P (θ|σ(Fi (0), X1 (1), C1 (1), X1 (2), C1 (2))) = P (θ|F(0)) (as in ’1.’), then pendant i’s optimal strategy is to give the answers
arg max
E (Π (|θ − X|)) in
XF (0)−measurable

rounds t = 3, . . . , 6,

arg max

E (Π (|θ − X|)) in the second round, as well as

XFi (1)−measurable

E (Π (|θ − X|)) in the first round.

arg max
XFi (0)−measurable

Proof. The proofs are analogous to the corresponding proofs of Proposition B.1.
Overall, we have thus derived the following results which correspond to Prediction 1:
if answers and confidence statements of the team members can be used to gain all relevant
information contained in the team members’ initial information, then the team leader will
state the optimal answer in rounds 2 through 6 and the pendants will state the optimal
answer in rounds 3 through 6.
B.1.3

Naı̈ve Models of Learning

Naive models of learning suppose that, from round to round, answers are convex combinations of own and other team members’ answers according to weights gij :
X1 (t + 1) = g11 X1 (t) + g12 X2 (t) + g13 X3 (t) + g14 X4 (t),
Xi (t + 1) = gi1 X1 (t) + gii Xi (t), i = 2, 3, 4.
Using the notation X(t) := (X1 (t), . . . , X4 (t))0 for t = 1, . . . , 6, the updating can
conveniently be written in vector and matrix notation as X(t + 1) = GX(t), where G is
given as follows:


g11 g12 g13 g14


g
0
0
g
(B.1)
G =  21 22
.
g31 0 g33 0 
g41 0
0 g44
G is a row-stochastic matrix which means that all entries of G are non-negative and
that, for each row, the sum of the corresponding entries equals unity. Additionally, to
avoid trivial special cases, we assume that all the parameters in equation (B.1) are strictly
positive: g11 , g1i , gi1 , gii > 0 for i = 2, 3, 4, meaning that, when updating, the team leader
takes into account the previous guesses of all team members, while all other team members
update their guesses using their own and the team leader’s previous guess.3
We first discuss under which conditions the team leader and pendants update their
guesses only once and twice, respectively.
3

In section 5.1, we study one baseline model, called the Sticking Model, in which this assumption is
not satisfied. In that model, we have gii = 1 for all i = 1, ..., 4 and hence gij = 0 for i 6= j.

5
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Proposition B.3.
1. The team leader’s guess is updated only once if and only if all
team members put identical weights to the team leader when updating. Formally:
(1, 0, 0, 0)0 G = (1, 0, 0, 0)0 Gt for all t if and only if g11 = g21 = g31 = g41 .
2. If the team leader’s guess is updated only once, then the other team members update
their guesses more than twice.
Proof.

1. First of all, notice that the team leader’s guess at time t is given by
(1, 0, 0, 0)0 Gt−1 X(1).

Furthermore, if (1, 0, 0, 0)0 G = (1, 0, 0, 0)0 G2 , then (1, 0, 0, 0)0 Gt−1 = (1, 0, 0, 0)0 G for
all t. We therefore only have to consider the first rows of G and G2 . For i = 2, 3, 4,
the i-th element of the first row of G2 is easily seen to be g1i (g11 + gii ). It equals
the corresponding element of G if and only if the equation g1i = g1i (g11 + gii ) holds.
This is equivalent to g11 + gii = 1 for i = 2, 3, 4, which in turn is equivalent to
g1i = 1 − gii = g11 for i = 2, 3, 4, because G is row-stochastic.
2. Similar to above, for checking whether the team members update more than twice,
it suffices to check whether the corresponding rows of G2 equal those of G3 . We
exemplarily consider the second team member and calculate (0, 1, 0, 0)0 G2 as well as
(0, 1, 0, 0)0 G3 , the calculations for i = 3, 4 are completely analogous. When the team
leader updates only once, the row-stochastic matrix G can be written as follows:


g11
g12
g13
g14


0
0 
g11 1 − g11
G=
,
0
1 − g11
0 
g11
g11
0
0
1 − g11
with g11 = 1 − g12 − g13 − g14 . From this, we find:
0
(0, 1, 0, 0)0 G2 = g11 , g12 g11 + (1 − g11 )2 , g13 g11 , g14 g11 ,
0
(0, 1, 0, 0)0 G3 = g11 , g12 g11 (2 − g11 ) + (1 − g11 )3 , g13 g11 (2 − g11 ), g14 g11 (2 − g11 ) .
Thus, the second team member will in general state different guesses after the second
and third updating.

Hence, we have a clear difference to the rational models. According to the naı̈ve
models, the team leader will update more than once, except for the special case that all
pendants put the same weight on the team leader’s previous guess when updating. If

6
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this special case is given, the pendants will update more than twice. Hence, under naı̈ve
models, it is not possible that agents state an optimal answer from round t = 3 on.
We now turn our attention to the quality of learning, by studying the mean absolute error of the team members’ guesses at the beginning and after the first round of
communication.
Lemma B.2. Let Y1 , . . . , Yn be n random variables and denote the corresponding mean
absolute errors by MAEYi := E(|Yi −θ|) for i = 1, . . . , n. Let further Y := λ1 Y1 +. . .+λn Yn
be a convex combination of Y1 , . . . , Yn with non-negative weights λ summing to unity and
denote the corresponding mean absolute error by MAEY := E(|Y − θ|). Then we have:
MAEY ≤ λ1 MAEY1 + . . . + λn MAEYn ,

(B.2)

with equality if and only if P ((Y1 ≥ θ ∧ . . . ∧ Yn ≥ θ) ∨ (Y1 ≤ θ ∧ . . . ∧ Yn ≤ θ)) = 1.
Proof. First of all
|Y − θ| = |λ1 Y1 + . . . + λn Yn − θ|
= |λ1 (Y1 − θ) + . . . + λn (Yn − θ)|
≤ λ1 |Y1 − θ| + . . . + λn |Yn − θ| ,
from which taking expectations yields
MAEY ≤ λ1 E (|Y1 − θ|) + . . . + λn E (|Yn − θ|) = λ1 MAEY1 + . . . + λn MAEYn ,
with equality if and only if |λ1 (Y1 − θ) + . . . + λn (Yn − θ)| equals λ1 |Y1 − θ|+. . .+λn |Yn − θ|
almost surely. Thus, to complete the proof, we only have to show that the latter happens
if and only if a1 := Y1 − θ, . . . , an := Yn − θ are either all non-negative or all non-positive
almost surely. To this end, we compute |a1 + . . . + an |2 = (a1 + . . . + an )2 and compare
P
this quantity to (|a1 | + . . . + |an |)2 . For the first quantity, we find a21 + . . . + a2n + ai aj ,
i6=j
P
while the second quantity equals a21 + . . . + a2n +
|ai | |aj |. The two quantities are thus
i6=j

equal if and only if ai aj = |ai aj | for all i, j, which only happens if a1 , . . . , an are either all
non-negative or all non-positive.
The following lemma is an immediate consequence of Lemma B.2.
Lemma B.3. For the weighted average X2:4 (1) := λ2 X2 (1) + λ3 X3 (1) + λ4 X4 (1) of the
1i
non-leaders’ opinions X2 (1), X3 (1), and X4 (1), with λi := g12 +gg13
for i = 2, 3, 4, we
+g14
have:
MAE2:4 (1) ≤ λ2 MAE2 (1) + λ3 MAE3 (1) + λ4 MAE4 (1),
(B.3)
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where MAE2:4 (1) := E (|X2:4 (1) − θ|) and MAEi (1) := E (|Xi (1) − θ|) for i = 2, 3, 4. In
equation (B.3), equality holds if and only if X2 (1), X3 (1), and X4 (1) lie on the same side
of θ almost surely, i.e., if




P X2 (1), X3 (1), X4 (1) ≥ θ ∨ X2 (1), X3 (1), X4 (1) ≤ θ = 1.
Lemma B.3 shows that averaging the pendants’ initial guesses typically is an improvement over their individual initial guesses.
Proposition B.4.
1. If MAE2:4 (1) ≤ MAE1 (1), then MAE1 (2) ≤ MAE1 (1), with

equality if and only if P (X1 (1) ≥ θ ∧ X2:4 (1) ≥ θ) ∨ (X1 (1) ≤ θ ∧ X2:4 (1) ≤ θ) = 1.
2. For i = 2, 3, 4: if MAE1 (1) ≤ MAEi (1), then MAEi (2) ≤ MAEi (1).
Proof.
1. Since X1 (2) = g11 X1 (1)+(g12 +g13 +g14 )X2:4 (1) with g11 +g12 +g13 +g14 = 1,
Lemma B.2 implies MAE1 (2) ≤ g11 MAE1 (1) + (1 − g11 ) MAE2:4 (1), from which the
assertion follows immediately.
2. Applying Lemma B.2 to Xi (2) = gi1 X1 (1)+gii Xi (1) yields MAEi (2) ≤ gi1 MAE1 (1)+
gii MAEi (1), from which the assertion follows immediately.
Proposition B.4 shows that the team leader’s guess will on average improve from the
first to the second round if the combination of the other team members’ initial guesses is
a signal that is not worse than the team leader’s initial one. This is a realistic assumption,
particularly under the random treatment T0. Furthermore, a pendant’s guess will improve
after the first updating if the team leader’s initial guess is on average not worse than that
pendant’s signal. This is a realistic assumption, particularly for treatments T1 accuracy
and T2 confidence.

B.2
B.2.1

Appendix for Section 5.1
Specific Rational Models

Building on the theoretical framework laid out above, we will now consider specific rational
models, by specifying in particular what information team members initially possess. To
start, however, we discuss how correct answers are modeled.
For ease of presentation, we interpret the correct answers to the questions asked in our
experiment as points in [0, 1], although answers had to be integer numbers between 0 and
100. For instance, 71, the correct answer to the question about the voter turnout to the
federal elections in Germany in 2009, is translated into 0.71 and could also be interpreted
as the probability of a randomly chosen eligible voter actually casting a ballot. This
8
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given, we assume that the prior, unconditional distribution of the correct answer is the
uniform distribution on the unit interval: θ ∼ U (0, 1), with probability density function
(pdf) fθ (p) = 1 for all p ∈ [0, 1], meaning that, a priori, before any agent has received
any information, all answers were equally likely to be the correct one. The uniform
distribution corresponds to a beta distribution β(1, 1) which was originally suggested as
the prior distribution by Thomas Bayes. With respect to initial information, we assume
that each team member i (i = 1, . . . , 4) observes a two-dimensional signal ψi = (Si , Fi )
which is, conditional on θ, stochastically independent from the other team members’
signals. This signal can be interpreted in the following way: every team member i has
some pool of observations, where observations can either be ’successes’ or ’failures’, and
the number of successes is Si , while the number of failures is Fi . Here, ’successes’ and
’failures’ mean that the condition asked for is fulfilled or not: in case of the voter turnout,
Si gives the number of people of which team member i knows that they cast a vote, while
Fi denotes the number of people of which team member i knows that they abstained from
voting.
The ’Standard’ Model
In the ’Standard’ model, it is assumed that all team members possess the same amount
of information, i.e., that S1 + F1 = . . . = S4 + F4 .4 With respect to the link between
the distribution of (Si , Fi ) to the unknown, correct answer, we assume the following: the
 s
i
probability of observing (Si , Fi ) = (si , fi ) is, conditional on θ = p, given by5 sis+f
·p i ·
i
(1−p)fi . Put differently, the number of successes follows, conditional on θ = p, a binomial
distribution with parameters p and n := si +fi . Observing the signal, team member i may
update the a priori belief by using Bayes’ rule, forming the distribution of θ conditional
on observing Si = si :
 s
si +fi
· p i · (1 − p)fi
psi · (1 − p)fi
si
fθ|Si =si ,Fi =fi (p) = 1
=
,
R si +fi 
B(si + 1, fi + 1)
s
f
· pe i · (1 − pe) i de
p
si
0

with B(α, β) denoting Euler’s beta function. Thus, team member i’s inital belief before
communication is a beta distribution with parameters si + 1 and fi + 1. Therefore, team
4

This number of observations may be some fixed integer, n, or, more generally, a random variable N
taking integer values.
5
If the number of observations is a random variable, then one also conditions on N = n, and P (N = n)·
appears as an additional factor.
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member i’s optimal answer in the first round is p∗ , with p∗ maximizing
Z1

∗

Z1

Π(|p − p |)fθ|Si =si ,Fi =fi (p)dp =
0

psi · (1 − p)fi
dp.
Π(|p − p |)
B(si + 1, fi + 1)
∗

0

Due to the specific structure of the payoff function used in our experiment, the beta
i
distribution’s mode, sis+f
= sni , is a very good approximation to p∗ , we will therefore
i
i
assume that team member i states the answer Xi (1) = sis+f
= sni in the first round.
i
Continuing the example on voter turnout: If an individual knows about ten citizens that
seven of them voted and three of them abstained, then his belief is beta distributed with
7
a mode of 7+3
= 0.7, which is his initial guess.
After the first round of answers, the team leader gets to know the answers of all team
members, thus the team leader can easily recover s2 , s3 , and s4 to gain the maximally
available information, F(0). The corresponding belief upon maximal information, i.e.,
upon observing s1 , . . . , s4 , is
fθ|S1 =s1 ,...,S4 =s4 ,F1 =f1 ,...,F4 =f4 (p) =

ps1 +...+s4 · (1 − p)f1 +...+f4
,
4
4
P
P
B(1 +
si , 1 +
fi )
i=1

again a beta distribution, with parameters 1+

4
P
i=1

si and 1+

i=1
4
P

fi . Thus, the team leader’s

i=1

s1 +...+s4
optimal answer in rounds 2 through 6 is the corresponding mode, s1 +...+s
=
4 +f1 +...+f4
s1 +...+s4
1
1
, which can be rewritten as 4 X1 (1) + . . . + 4 X4 (1), an equally weighted average of
4n
the team members’ first-round answers.
The other team members’ second-round answers can be built using only the corresponding initial signal, ψi , as well as the team leader’s first-round answer, X1 (1). The
latter allows to infer s1 , thus team member i’s knowledge in the second round consists
of s1 and si . Analogously to above, it is easy to derive that the corresponding belief is
again a beta distribution, with parameters 1 + s1 + si and 1 + f1 + fi . The corresponding
optimal answers in the second round thus are 21 X1 (1) + 12 Xi (1), while from round 3 on,
the team leader’s optimal answer will be copied.
Overall, the updating in the ’Standard’ model can be summarized as follows:

Summary 1 (Standard Model ). The team leader computes the unweighted average of all
team members’ first-round answers and states 14 X1 (1) + . . . + 41 X4 (1) from round 2 on,
the other team members state 12 X1 (1) + 21 Xi (1) in round 2, and they join the team leader
in stating the average of the team’s first-round answers from round 3 on.
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The ’Sophisticated’ Model
For the ’Sophisticated’ model, the link between the distribution of the signal ψi = (Si , Fi )
to the unknown, correct answer, θ, looks as follows: the probability of observing (Si , Fi ) =

(si , fi ) is, conditional on θ = p and Si + Fi = ni := si + fi , given by sni · psi · (1 − p)fi .
Put differently, the number of successes follows, conditional on θ = p and Si + Fi = ni , a
binomial distribution with parameters p and ni = Si +Fi . As for the ’Standard’ model, one
easily derives that team member i’s belief about the correct answer is a beta distribution
i
with parameters 1 + si and 1 + fi , implying that the first-round answer is sis+f
= nsii .
i
In our experiment, team members were not only asked about their guess with respect
to the correct answer to the question at hand, but they also supplied a measure of the
confidence in their answer. More precisely, they essentially provided an interval that
should contain the correct answer with a probability of 90%. Based on the Beta(1+si , 1+
fi )-belief, team member i’s first-round statement thus does not only consist of guessing
the correct answer by Xi (1) = nsii , but also of supplying the corresponding confidence
Ci (1) which is a function of si and fi , Ci (1) = Conf(si , fi ).
After the first round of answers, the team leader gets to know not only the answers of all
i
, but also their confidence statements, Ci (1) = Conf(si , fi )
team members, Xi (1) = sis+f
i
(i = 2, 3, 4). Using these, the team leader can recover s2 , s3 , and s4 as well as f2 , f3 , and
f4 , to gain the maximally available information, F(0). The corresponding belief upon
maximal information, i.e., upon observing s1 , . . . , s4 , f1 , . . . , f4 , is
fθ|S1 =s1 ,...,S4 =s4 ,F1 =f1 ,...,F4 =f4 (p) =

ps1 +...+s4 · (1 − p)f1 +...+f4
,
4
4
P
P
B(1 +
si , 1 +
fi )
i=1

again a beta distribution, with parameters 1+

4
P
i=1

si and 1+

i=1
4
P

fi . Thus, the team leader’s

i=1

s1 +...+s4
optimal answer in rounds 2 through 6 is the corresponding mode, s1 +...+s
=
4 +f1 +...+f4
s1 +...+s4
n1
n4
, which can be rewritten as n1 +...+n4 X1 (1)+. . .+ n1 +...+n4 X4 (1), a weighted average
n1 +...+n4
of the team members’ first-round answers.
The other team members’ second-round answers can be build using only the corresponding initial signal, ψi , as well as the team leader’s first-round answer and confidence
statement, X1 (1) and C1 (1). The latter quantities allow to infer s1 and f1 , thus team
member i’s knowledge in the second round consists of s1 , si and f1 , fi . Analogously to
above, it is easy to derive that the corresponding belief is again a beta distribution, with
parameters 1 + s1 + si and 1 + f1 + fi . The corresponding optimal answers in the second
i
1
i
round thus are ns11 +s
= n1n+n
X1 (1) + n1n+n
Xi (1), while from round 3 on, the team leader’s
+ni
i
i
optimal answer will be copied.
Overall, the updating in the ’Sophisticated’ model can be summarized as follows:
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Summary 2 (Sophisticated Model ). The team leader computes a weighted average of all
team members’ first-round answers and states
N1
N4
X1 (1) + . . . +
X4 (1)
N1 + N2 + N3 + N4
N1 + N2 + N3 + N4
1
i
from round 2 on, the other team members state N1N+N
X1 (1) + N1N+N
Xi (1) in round 2, and
i
i
they join the team leader in stating the weighted average of the team’s first-round answers
from round 3 on.

B.2.2

Models of Rational Learning with Conservatism

In the following, we will enrich the models of rational learning by conservatism that
results from overprecision. Overprecision is the empirically observed phenomenon that
people typically provide too narrow confidence intervals when asked about their confidence. To model overprecision, we will assume that agents treat their initial private
signal as more precise than it actually is. We will further assume that agents account for
the fact that other team members are overprecise, but are blind with respect to their own
level of overprecision. While the level of overprecision is in principle agent-specific, our
analysis focuses on the case in which all agents are equally overprecise. The models with
overprecision nest the rational models when setting the level of overprecision to zero.
The ’Standard Plus’ model
By the ’Standard Plus’ model, we denote the extension of the ’Standard’ model by overprecision. The only difference to the ’Standard’ model is that we assume that team
members misinterpret their signal: when the signal actually is ψi = (si , fi ), team member i will interpret it as if the received signal was (τ si , τ fi ), where τ ≥ 1 is a parameter to capture overprecision.6 Therefore, team member i’s belief in the first round
will be given by a Beta(1 + τ si , 1 + τ fi ) distribution, leading to the first-round ansi
= sni , as in the ’Standard’ model. However, after learning from the other
swer τ siτ+τ
fi
team members, the second-round answers are still prone to overprecision: from round
τ s1 +s2 +...+s4
2 on, the team leader will state τ s1 +s2 +...+s
, which can be rewritten as
4 +τ f1 +f2 +...+f4
τ
1
1
1
X (1) + τ +3 X2 (1) + τ +3 X3 (1) + τ +3 X4 (1). Similarly, other team members will state
τ +3 1
1
τ
X (1) + τ +1
Xi (1) in the second round (i = 2, 3, 4). In rounds 3 though 6, however,
τ +1 1
in contrast to the ’Standard’ model, the other team members will not copy the team
leader’s second-round
answer. Instead, driven by overconfidence, team member i will
P
τ si +
sj
P 1
j6=i
P , which can be rewritten as τ Xi (1) +
state τ si + P sj +τ
X (1).
fi +
fj
τ +3
τ +3 j
j6=i

j6=i

j6=i

6

In our empirical application, τ is fixed to τ = 5, in order to appropriately account for the overprecision
inherent in the confidence intervals given by the team members.
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Overall, the updating in the ’Standard Plus’ model can be summarized as follows:
Summary 3 (Standard-Plus Model ). The team leader computes a weighted average of all
1
1
τ
X1 (1) + τ +3
X2 (1) + . . . + τ +3
X4 (1) from
team members’ first-round answers and states τ +3
1
τ
round 2 on, other team member i states τ +1 X1 (1) + τ +1 Xi (1) in round 2 (i = 2, 3, 4),
P 1
τ
while stating τ +3
Xi (1) +
X (1) from round 3 on.
τ +3 j
j6=i

The ’Sophisticated Plus’ model
By the ’Sophisticated Plus’ model, we denote the extension of the ’Sophisticated’ model
by overprecision. The only difference to the ’Sophisticated’ model is that we assume that
team members misinterpret their signal: as above, when the signal actually is ψi = (si , fi ),
team member i will interpret it as if the received signal was (τ si , τ fi ). Therefore, team
member i’s belief in the first round will be given by a Beta(1 + τ si , 1 + τ fi ) distribution,
si
leading to the first-round answer τ siτ+τ
= nsii , as in the ’Sophisticated’ model. However,
fi
after learning from the other team members, the second-round answers are still biased
τ s1 +s2 +...+s4
by overprecision: from round 2 on, the team leader will state τ s1 +s2 +...+s
,
4 +τ f1 +f2 +...+f4
τ n1
n2
n3
which can be rewritten as τ n1 +n2 +n3 +n4 X1 (1) + τ n1 +n2 +n3 +n4 X2 (1) + τ n1 +n2 +n3 +n4 X3 (1) +
ni
n4
n1
X (1) + n1τ+τ
X (1)
X (1). Similarly, other team members will state n1 +τ
τ n1 +n2 +n3 +n4 4
ni 1
ni i
in the second round (i = 2, 3, 4). In rounds 3 though 6, however, in contrast to the
Sophisticated Model, the other team members will not copy the team leader’s second-round
P
answer. Instead, driven by overconfidence, team member i will state
P
nj
P
which can be rewritten as τ ni +τ nPi nj Xi (1) +
X (1).
τ ni +
nj j
j6=i

j6=i

τ si +
sj
j6=i
P
P ,
τ si +
sj +τ fi +
fj
j6=i

j6=i

j6=i

Overall, the updating in the ’Sophisticated Plus’ model can be summarized as follows:
Summary 4 (Sophisticated-Plus Model ). The team leader computes a weighted average
of all team members’ first-round answers and states
4

X
Nj
τ N1
X1 (1) +
Xj (1)
τ N1 + N2 + N3 + N4
τ
N
+
N
+
N
+
N
1
2
3
4
j=2
from round 2 on, other team member i states
(i = 2, 3, 4), while stating

N1
X (1)
N1 +τ Ni 1

+

τ Ni
X (1)
N1 +τ Ni i

in round 2

X
Nj
τ Ni
P Xi (1) +
P Xj (1)
τ Ni +
Nj
τ
N
Nj
i+
j6=i
j6=i

j6=i

from round 3 on.
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C

Appendix: Details of the Experimental Design

The experiment was run in eleven sessions (which followed after two pilot sessions) in
August and September 2013. It was conducted in the experimental laboratory of the
Faculty of Economic and Social Sciences at the University of Hamburg, Germany. It
was programmed using zTree (Fischbacher, 2007) and organized and recruited with hroot
(Bock et al., 2014). In total 176 university students with various academic backgrounds
participated in the experiment. The participants earned on average EUR 9.50. The
norm at the lab was EUR 10. Each session lasted approximately 60 minutes, including
instructions, questionnaire and payments.
Subjects were randomly assigned to computer terminals. After all participants were
seated, two sets of instructions were handed out, a German version as well as an English
translation. The German instructions were read aloud to establish common knowledge.
The subjects were then given the possibility to ask questions, which were answered privately. The instructions were left with the participants for reference during the whole
experiment. In the instructions it was pointed out that the use of mobile phones, smart
phones as well as tablets or similar devices would lead to expulsion from the experiment
and exclusion from all payments.7 There were no data exclusions.
All decisions and the payments at the end of the experiment were made anonymously.
The participants were not informed about the identity of any other participant and they
were paid privately upon completion of each session. The individual computer terminals
were separated by boards and could be partially closed with curtains.

C.1

Experimental Task

The design of the experiment draws upon the studies by Lorenz et al. (2011), Rauhut and
Lorenz (2011), and Moussaı̈d et al. (2013). The subjects were asked to give estimates on
factual questions and to state their confidence level. The experiment was based on questions with hard facts, because they admit an unambiguously correct answer. For instance,
voter turnout in a specific election is officially counted and reported. The questions for
the experiment were chosen from a pool of questions that were used in previous studies,
in particular in the three studies just cited above. The questions cover various fields of
knowledge. The questions were chosen so that subjects were unlikely to know the exact
answer. At the same time questions for which they did not have any knowledge at all
were avoided. In order to avoid highly skewed responses the questions were such that
the correct answers lay in an interval of 0% to 100%. The complete list of questions is
7

Two participants had to be excluded from payment for the use of a mobile phone. Whether they
intended to cheat in the task or used their phones for other purposes is not known. The experimental
results do not rely on decisions of these two subjects. Their decisions are kept in the results reported in
the paper.
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reported in Table C.1. Participants could answer with any integer number between (and
including) 0 and 100. The time to answer a question was not limited, the subjects were,
however, given a reference time of 25 seconds per answer. The remaining time could be
observed on the screens, but participants were informed beforehand that running out of
time did not bear any consequences.
Phase

A

B

Identifier

Question

Correct Answer

A1

What was the voter turnout of the federal elections in Germany in 2005?

78

A2

What is the share of water in a cucumber?

95

A3

What share of the world-wide land area is used for agriculture?

18

A4

What is the percentage of the world’s population that lives in North- and Southamerica?

14

A5

What is the percentage of the world’s population between 15 and 64 years old?

65

A6

What is the percentage of female professors in Germany?

18

A7

What is the share of people with blood type B (BB or B0)?

11

A8

What is the percentage of the world’s roads (paved and unpaved) that are in India?

11

B1

What was the voter turnout of the federal elections in Germany in 2009?

71

B2

What is the share of water in an onion?

89

B3

What share of the working population is working in the agricultural sector?

40

B4

What is the percentage of the world’s population that lives in Africa?

15

B5

What is the percentage of the world’s population older than 15, that can read and write?

82

B6

What is the percentage of female Nobel laureates in literature (until 2010)?

11

B7

What is the share of people with blood type A (AA or A0)?

43

B8

What is the percentage of the world’s airports that are located in the United States?

30

Table C.1: Overview of all Questions
Confidence was measured on a nine point scale from 0 to 65+. Each value indicated
a range of expected deviation of the individual estimate from the true value. The scale
was explained in the instructions. For better understanding, a verbal interpretation was
added. Table C.2 appeared in the instructions and gives a detailed description. As it
can be seen in Table C.2, the distances between successive items are increasing. A simple
nine point scale from 1 to 9 would have created the impression of equivalence of the
distances. To avoid misinterpretation of the scale the values on the scale used in the
experiment directly corresponded to the expected range of deviations. The same values
were displayed on the screens. The confidence indication was not (directly) incentivized.

C.2

Phase I

The experiment consisted of two phases. The first set of instructions was handed out
to the participants before the first phase. In phase I, each subject had to answer eight
questions and indicate her confidence level. Each question was answered once. An English
translation to the questions was provided on the screens. The order of the questions was
randomized over the participants. The subjects were informed that there was going to
15
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Table C.2: Summary of the Confidence Scale and its Interpretation
Scale

I assume that my estimation most likely (in nine of ten cases)

Concerning my estimation I am

does not deviate by more than
0

0 percentage points from the true value

absolutely confident

1

1 percentage points from the true value

pronouncedly confident

2

2 percentage points from the true value

very confident

4

4 percentage points from the true value

rather confident

8
8Phase
percentage
3.1.1
A points from the true value
16

16 percentage points from the true value

partially confident
rather unconfident

32 percentage
pointsof
from
true value
very was
unconfident
The32experiment
consisted
twothe
phases.
The first set of instructions
handed out
64 percentage
pointsthe
from
true value
unconfident
to 64
the participants
before
firstthephase.
In phase A, each subject pronouncedly
had to answer
eight
65+ 65and
percentage
or more from
theEach
truequestion
value
absolutely
unconfident
questions
indicate points
her confidence
level.
was answered
once. An
English
translation to the questions was provided on the screens. The order of the questions was
be a second over
phase
new instructions
and were
that their
choices
phase
might toaffect
randomized
thewith
participants.
The subjects
informed
thatin
there
wasI going
be a
phase II. However, participants did not know the relation between phase I and phase II.
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questions, which were again answered privately, phase II started. The participants were
randomly matched into groups of four. Four is the minimum number of individuals
required for a star network that is no simple line. The groups were fixed for the remainder
of the experiment. The subjects were again asked to answer eight questions, but in
phase II each question was answered six times (t = 1, ..., 6 estimation periods). In the
first estimation period the subjects individually answered the questions and stated their
confidence level. The first period was, therefore, analogous to phase I. In the second
estimation period the subjects were informed about the other group members’ guesses
in period one according to their position in a star network. The subject at the central
node could observe all answers and confidence information given by the members of her
group. The pendants could observe the answer and confidence information given by their
submitted new estimations and confidence levels. Period two was repeated four times
group’s center. In addition, everyone was shown their own last answer and confidence
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Figure 3.2. Screen Shot of Phase B from the Viewpoint of a Pendant

Figure 3.3. Screen
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from
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C.4

Treatments

The selection criterion for the individual at the center of the star network varied with the
treatments. The center was fixed for one question round, that is for six estimation periods.
The pendants were named A,B and C. The names changed with each question round. The
positions and the selection criteria were communicated on screen at the beginning of each
question round. The criterion changed once after the fourth question round. This piece
of information was communicated to the subjects in the instructions for phase II.
21
The selection was either random or it was based on information from phase I. Each
question in phase II had a partner question in phase I. The partner questions were two
questions considered similar to each other and from the same field of interest. It could be
expected that the individual error and confidence levels for the two partner questions were
correlated. It was communicated that questions in phase II partially resembled questions
from phase I, but were never identical.
Treatment T1 was a high accuracy treatment. This type of selection rule is based
on the quality of the estimates of the partner questions in phase I. In each group, the
agent who had made the smallest error in her estimation of the answer to the partner
question was chosen to be in the center for this question round. Treatment T2 was a
high confidence treatment. The selection in treatment T2 was based on the confidence
level indicated in phase I for the partner question. The agent with the highest confidence
within each group was selected. Treatment T0 was a control treatment. In this treatment
the central agent was determined by a random pick. It was also made clear that in case
of a tie in T1 or T2, a random choice was made between the group members who were
18
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eligible for the center position.
It was necessary to separate the question determining the central node from the actual question of interest and, therefore, include two phases in the experiment for several
reasons. If the selection had been based on the first estimation period, by communicating
that the center had had the best initial guess on that question in treatment T1, the participants would have gained outside information about the true state of the world. With the
introduction of the partner question it was possible to reduce the level of outside information to a minimum. Furthermore, the questions were asked in successive rounds, i.e., the
second to sixth period of every question round immediately followed the initial period.
Communication of the selection mechanism could have induced strategic considerations
on the side of the participants. Particularly in treatment T2, a misrepresentation of the
confidence level to get the desired position in the network could have been expected. In
order to rule out intentional misrepresentation, we collected the data in phase I before its
role in the determination of the network of phase II was communicated.

C.5

Permutation of Treatments

To avoid session effects, each treatment was run at each session. Each group played
two different treatments in a fixed order. They started with either treatment T1 or T2
and then changed to treatment T0 after the fourth question round, or they started with
treatment T0 and then changed to treatment T1 or T2. Table C.3 shows a detailed
breakdown of the distribution of participants over the treatments.
Table C.3: Summary of Treatments
Treatment

C.6

Participants

T0 Random / T1 Accuracy

44

T0 Random / T2 Confidence

40

T1 Accuracy / T0 Random

44

T2 Confidence / T0 Random

48

Payment

The subject’s payment was based on the individual error of the estimation. The error
was calculated as the absolute difference between the estimation and the correct answer.
The individual error was converted into game points as described in Table C.4.

19
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Table C.4: Summary of Payments
Distance

Points

0 percentage points

16 game points

1 percentage point

8 game points

2 percentage points

4 game points

3 or 4 percentage points

2 game points

5,6,7 or 8 percentage points

1 game point

more than 9 percentage points

0 game points

One question was randomly selected for payment in phase I. In phase II, one estimation period was randomly chosen for each question round. The choice was identical
for everyone. The monetary incentive in this form encouraged the subjects to find the
true answers. Payoffs only depended on one’s own decisions. Neither there is incentive to
improve other’s choices or to be better than others. The experimental design put subjects
into a position in which they would try to get as close to the truth as possible by using
their own knowledge and information from others (Lorenz et al., 2011). The game points
were converted with an exchange rate of EUR 0.3 per point. The total payment was:
EUR 5 show up fee + game points from phase I · 0.3 + game points from phase II · 0.3.
The maximum payment possible was EUR 48.2.
The experiment was concluded by a short questionnaire. After all participants had
finished answering the questionnaire, the correct solutions to all estimate questions were
displayed on screen. The participants were then paid anonymously at two cash desks at
the exits of the laboratory.

C.7

Pretest Sessions

Two pretest sessions were run on the 6th and 19th of August, 2013 with 15 and 16
participants, respectively, in order to calibrate the number of questions and the conversion
rate. We determined the sample size prior to the experiment and the pretest sessions by
a heuristic statistical power analysis.

D

Instructions

The original instructions are written in English and in German. On the next pages we
provide the original instructions, first for phase I of the experiment, then for phase II.

20
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Herzlich Willkommen zum Experiment!
Sie nehmen nun an einem Experiment zur ökonomischen Entscheidungsfindung teil. Bitte beachten
Sie, dass ab nun und während des gesamten Experiments keine Kommunikation gestattet ist. Wenn
Sie eine Frage haben, strecken Sie bitte die Hand aus der Kabine, einer der Experimentatoren kommt
dann zu Ihnen. Während des gesamten Experiments ist das Benutzen von Handys, Smartphones,
Tablets oder Ähnlichem untersagt. Bitte beachten Sie, dass eine Zuwiderhandlung zum Ausschluss
von dem Experiment und von sämtlichen Zahlungen führt.
Sämtliche Entscheidungen erfolgen anonym, d.h. keiner der anderen Teilnehmenden erfährt die
Identität des Anderen. Auch die Auszahlung erfolgt anonym am Ende des Experiments. Das bedeutet,
dass keiner der anderen Teilnehmenden erfährt, wie hoch Ihre Auszahlung ist.
Anleitung zum Experiment und allgemeine Informationen
Das Experiment besteht aus zwei Phasen. Sie erhalten zunächst die Instruktionen für die Phase I des
Experiments. Die Instruktionen für die Phase II erhalten Sie nachdem alle Teilnehmenden die erste
Phase abgeschlossen haben. Ihre Angaben in Phase I können in manchen Fällen Einfluss auf Phase II
haben. Auf Phase II folgt ein kurzer Fragebogen.
Informationen zu Phase I des Experiments
In diesem Experiment geht es um das möglichst gute Einschätzen von bestimmten Größen. Je nach
Qualität Ihrer Schätzungen erhalten Sie Punkte, die am Ende des Experiments zu Ihrer Auszahlung in
Euro führen.
In der ersten Phase des Experiments werden Sie gebeten, acht Fragen zu beantworten. Gefragt ist
jeweils nach einem Prozentwert und Sie können stets nur ganze Zahlen zwischen (und einschließlich)
0 und 100 als Schätzung angeben. Das Prozentzeichen soll dabei nicht eingegeben werden. Die
wahren Werte beruhen auf offiziellen Statistiken und wurden, insofern dies nötig war, auf ganze
Zahlen gerundet.
Sie werden außerdem gebeten, Ihr Vertrauen in Ihre Schätzung auf einer Skala anzugeben
(Vertrauensangabe). Bitte entnehmen Sie die Bedeutung der Werte auf der Skala der folgenden
Übersicht, die jedem Zahlenwert auch eine verbale Interpretation beifügt:

Skala Ich gehe davon aus, dass meine Schätzung Ich bin mir bei meiner Schätzung:
höchstwahrscheinlich* nicht mehr als

0
1
2
4
8
16
32
64
65+

0 Prozentpunkte vom wahren Wert abweicht.
1 Prozentpunkt vom wahren Wert abweicht.
2 Prozentpunkte vom wahren Wert abweicht.
4 Prozentpunkte vom wahren Wert abweicht.
8 Prozentpunkte vom wahren Wert abweicht.
16 Prozentpunkte vom wahren Wert abweicht.
32 Prozentpunkte vom wahren Wert abweicht.
64 Prozentpunkte vom wahren Wert abweicht.
65 Prozentpunkte oder mehr vom wahren Wert
abweicht.
(* in 9 von 10 Fällen)

absolut sicher
ausgesprochen sicher
sehr sicher
eher sicher
teilweise sicher
eher unsicher
sehr unsicher
ausgesprochen unsicher
absolut unsicher
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Beispiel:
Nehmen wir an, Ihre Schätzung beträgt 50% und Sie sind sich bei dieser Schätzung „eher sicher“
(Skalenwert 4). Das bedeutet, dass Sie davon ausgehen, dass Ihre Schätzung von 50%
höchstwahrscheinlich (in 9 von 10 Fällen) nicht mehr als 4 Prozentpunkte von dem wahren Wert
abweicht, der wahre Wert also zwischen 46% und 54% liegt.
Grafik 1 zeigt beispielhaft, welche Bildschirmoberfläche Sie bei jeder Frage erwartet. In das
Eingabefeld für die Schätzung, soll eine Zahl zwischen 0 und 100 eingegeben werden. Darunter
erfolgt die Angabe des Vertrauens auf der angezeigten Skala. Bitte bestätigen Sie Ihre Eingaben durch
Klick auf den Weiter-Button (nicht ersichtlich in Grafik 1).

Berechnung Ihres Einkommens aus Phase I
Grundlage für die Gewinnberechnung ist der Abstand Ihrer Schätzung zum richtigen Wert – je näher
Sie am richtigen Wert liegen, desto mehr Geld erhalten Sie. Der Abstand wird berechnet als der
absolute Betrag der Differenz zwischen Ihrer eigenen Schätzung und dem wahren Wert. Ihr Gewinn
hängt ausschließlich von Ihrer eigenen Schätzung ab.
Punktevergabe:
•
•
•
•
•
•

16 Punkte erhalten Sie, wenn Ihre Schätzung exakt den richtigen Wert trifft (0
Prozentpunkte Abstand).
8 Punkte erhalten Sie, wenn Ihre Schätzung fast exakt den richtigen Wert trifft (1
Prozentpunkt Abstand).
4 Punkte erhalten Sie für eine kleine Abweichung der Schätzung vom wahren Wert (2
Prozentpunkte Abstand).
2 Punkte erhalten Sie für eine mittlere Abweichung der Schätzung vom wahren Wert (3 oder
4 Prozentpunkte Abstand).
1 Punkt erhalten Sie für eine größere Abweichung der Schätzung vom wahren Wert (5, 6, 7,
oder 8 Prozentpunkte Abstand).
Weicht Ihre Schätzung stark vom richtigen Wert ab (Abstand von 9 Prozentpunkten und
mehr), erhalten Sie für diese Runde keine Punkte.
Seite | 2
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Für Ihr Einkommen in Phase I wird aus den 8 Fragen zufällig eine auszahlungsrelevante Frage
ausgelost. Ihr Einkommen ergibt sich dann durch Ihre dort erzielte Punktzahl, wobei folgender
Wechselkurs gilt: 1 Punkt entspricht 0,30 €. Das maximal mögliche Einkommen in Phase I beträgt
4,80 €.
Beispiel (fortgesetzt):
Sie haben bei einer Frage 50% geschätzt. Nehmen wir an, dass der wahre Wert bei 48% liegt, dann
beträgt Ihr Abstand 2. Wenn diese Frage als auszahlungsrelevant ausgelost wird, dann bekommen Sie
4 Punkte und damit 1,20 € ausgezahlt.
Gesamteinkommen
Ihr Gesamteinkommen aus dem Experiment setzt sich aus den garantierten 5 €, plus Ihrem
Einkommen aus Phase I, plus Ihrem Einkommen aus Phase II zusammen und wird am Ende des
Experiments ausgezahlt.

Viel Erfolg!
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Welcome to today‘s experiment!
You are now participating in an experiment concerning economic decision making. Please note that
from now on and during the time of the experiment communication is not allowed. If you have any
questions, please indicate this by showing your hand outside of the individual cabin; one of the
experimenters will come to assist you. The use of mobile phones, tablet PCs and similar devices is not
allowed during the time of the experiment. Please note that a violation of this rule will lead to an
expulsion of the experiment and will exclude you from any payment.
All decisions are made anonymously, i.e. none of the other participants will get to know the identity
of a decision maker. Similarly, the payment is made anonymously such that none of the other
participants will get to know how much you earn.
Instructions and general information
The experiment consists of two phases. You are now holding the instructions for phase I. You will
receive the instructions for phase II after all participants have completed phase I. In some cases the
choices in phase I might affect phase II. After phase II there will be a short questionnaire to answer.
Information about phase I of the experiment
This experiment is about estimating certain figures as accurately as possible. Your score depends on
the quality of your estimations and will be transformed into a payment in Euros at the end of the
experiment.
In the first phase of the experiment you are asked to answer eight questions. Each questions is about
some percentage of a face value and you can type in integer numbers between (and including) 0 and
100 as an estimate. Thereby, the percent sign should not be typed in. The true values are based on
some official statistical reports and were, if applicable, rounded to the next integer.
In addition, we ask you for your confidence in your estimate on a scale. The meaning of each value of
the scale can be found in the following table, which adds a verbal interpretation to each quantity.

Scale I assume that my estimation most likely* Concerning my estimation I am
does not deviate by more than

0
1
2
4
8
16
32
64
65+

0 percentage points from the true value.
1 percentage points from the true value.
2 percentage points from the true value.
4 percentage points from the true value.
8 percentage points from the true value.
16 percentage points from the true value.
32 percentage points from the true value.
64 percentage points from the true value.
65 percentage points or more from the true
value.
(* in 9 out of 10 cases)

absolutely confident
pronouncedly confident
very confident
rather confident
partially confident
rather unconfident
very unconfident
pronouncedly unconfident
absolutely unconfident
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Example:
Suppose your estimation is 50% and concerning this estimation you feel „rather confident“ (value 4
on scale). This means that you assume that your estimation most likely (in 9 out of 10 cases)

does not deviate by more than 4 percentage points from the true value, i.e. that the true value lies
within 46% and 54%.
Figure 1 gives an example for the screen which you will see for each question. The first input is your
estimation, which must be a number between 0 and 100. The second input is your confidence level.
Please confirm your choices by clicking on the „Weiter“ button (which is not illustrated in Figure 1).

Calculation of your income from phase I
Profits are based on the distance of your estimation to the true value – the closer you are to the true
value, the more money you earn. The distance is computed as the absolute value of the difference
between your estimation and the true value. Your profit solely depends on your own estimation.
Score:
•
•
•
•
•
•

You receive 16 points if your estimation hits exactly the true value (distance of 0 percentage
points).
You receive 8 points if your estimation hits almost exactly the true value (distance of 1
percentage point).
You receive 4 points for a small distance of your estimation to the true value (distance of 2
percentage points).
You receive 2 points for a medium distance of your estimation to the true value (distance of
3 or 4 percentage points).
You receive 1 point for a larger distance of your estimation to the true value (distance of 5, 6,
7, or 8 percentage points).
If your estimation strongly deviates from the true value (distance of 9 percentage points or
more), then you receive no points in this round.
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To generate your income of phase I, one of the 8 questions will be randomly drawn to be payoffrelevant. Your income in phase I is then derived from your score in this question, whereas the
following exchange rate applies: 1 point corresponds to 0,30 €. The maximal possible income in
phase I is 4,80 €.
Example (continued):
You have estimated 50% in some question. Let us suppose that the true value is 48%. Then your
distance is 2. If this question is drawn to be payoff-relevant, then you receive 4 points such that you
will earn 1,20 €.
Total income
Your total income from the experiment consists of the guaranteed 5 €, plus your income from phase
I, plus your income from phase II, and will be paid by the end of the experiment.

Good luck!
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Informationen zu Phase II des Experiments:
In Phase II werden Sie erneut gebeten, 8 unterschiedliche Fragen zu beantworten und Ihre jeweilige
Vertrauensangabe zu machen. Bitte beachten Sie, dass die Fragen in Phase II den Fragen aus Phase I
des Experiments teilweise ähnlich sind, sie sind jedoch in keinem Fall identisch! Nach Ihrer ersten
Schätzung zu einer Frage werden Sie noch fünf weitere Male gebeten, eine Schätzung für die gleiche
Frage abzugeben. Ab der ersten Wiederholung bekommen Sie je nach Spielmodus Informationen
über die Angaben anderer Spieler.
Zu Beginn der Phase II werden Sie entweder in eine Vierergruppe eingeteilt oder Sie spielen diese
Phase einzeln. Sowohl die Zuordnung als auch die Zusammensetzung der Gruppen erfolgen zufällig
und ändern sich während des Experiments nicht mehr.
Gruppenmodus
In jeder Vierergruppe wird ein Spieler für die Dauer einer Frage für die
Rolle des Zentrumsspielers ausgewählt, während die drei anderen die
Außenspieler sind (Grafik 2). Der Auswahlmechanismus wird jeweils
bekannt gegeben und wechselt einmal nach der vierten Frage. Die Auswahl
basiert entweder auf Angaben aus Phase I oder erfolgt zufällig.
Sie werden nun sechs Mal geben, eine Schätzung für die gleiche Frage
abzugeben. In der ersten Schätzrunde stehen noch keine Informationen zur Verfügung. Von der
zweiten bis zur sechsten Schätzrunde sieht der Zentrumsspieler die vorangegangenen Schätzungen
und Vertrauensangaben der Außenspieler, während die Außenspieler die Schätzung und
Vertrauensangabe des Zentrumsspielers sehen, nicht jedoch die Eingaben der jeweils anderen
Außenspieler.
Grafiken 3 und 4 zeigen beispielhaft, wie die Bildschirmoberflächen für einen Außenspieler und einen
Zentrumsspieler aussehen können.
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Bitte beachten Sie, dass die Bezeichnungen A, B und C für jede Frage, also für sechs Antworten,
bestehen bleiben und dann neu vergeben werden.
Im Einzelmodus werden ebenfalls 6 Schätzungen zu jeder Frage abgegeben. Die dabei
bereitstehenden Informationen werden für jede Frage auf dem Bildschirm erläutert. Die Art der
Information wechselt einmal nach der vierten Frage.
Berechnung Ihres Einkommens aus Phase II
Für die Berechnung des Einkommens aus Phase II wird für jede der 8 Fragen genau eine
auszahlungsrelevante Runde zufällig durch den Computer bestimmt. Genau wie in Phase I ist der
Abstand Ihrer Schätzung zum wahren Wert Grundlage für die Gewinnberechnung. Je näher Sie in der
zufällig ausgewählten Runde am richtigen Wert liegen, desto mehr Geld erhalten Sie (siehe
Punktevergabe in den Instruktionen zu Phase I). Bitte beachten Sie, dass, auch wenn Sie in einer
Gruppe spielen, nur Ihre eigene Schätzung Einfluss auf Ihren Gewinn hat.
Ihr Einkommen aus Phase II ergibt sich aus der Summe der Punkte, die Sie für jede Frage in der
jeweils auszahlungsrelevanten Runde gesammelt haben, wobei nach wie vor der Wechselkurs von 1
Punkt entspricht 0,30 € gilt. Das maximal mögliche Einkommen in Phase II beträgt 38,40 €.
Gesamteinkommen
Ihr Gesamteinkommen aus dem Experiment setzt sich aus den garantierten 5 €, plus Ihrem
Einkommen aus Phase I, plus Ihrem Einkommen aus Phase II zusammen.
Ihre Auszahlung sowie die tatsächlichen Werte erfahren Sie am Ende des Experiments.

Viel Erfolg!
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Information concerning phase II of the experiment
In phase II you are asked again to answer 8 questions and to provide your confidence levels. Please
note that the questions of phase II partially resemble the questions of phase I, but they are never
identical! After your first estimation concerning one question you will be asked 5 further times to
provide an estimation for the same question. After the first repetition – depending on the mode of
play – you will receive information about other players’ decisions.
At the beginning of phase II you are either assigned into a group of four players or you will be a single
player. Both the assignment and the composition of the groups are generated randomly and will not
change for the time of the experiment.
Group mode
In each group of four, one player is selected to be the central player for
the time of one question, while the other three are peripheral players
(Figure 2). The selection mechanism is announced each time and will once
change after four questions. The selection is either based on inputs from
phase I or is made randomly.
You will then be asked 6 times to provide an estimation for the same
question. In the first round of estimation no information is provided. From the second round up to
the 6th round the central player can see the previous estimations and confidence choices of the
peripheral players, while the peripheral players can see the previous estimation and confidence
choice by the central player, but not those of the other peripheral players.
Figure 3 and 4 illustrate how computer screens of a peripheral player and of a central player might
look like.
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Please note that the labels A, B, and C are fixed for each question, i.e. for six answers, and then they
are newly assigned.
In the single-player mode you also have to provide 6 estimations for each question. The available
pieces of information will be specified for each question on the computer screen. The type of
information changes once after the fourth question.
Calculation of your income in phase II
To compute your income in phase II, for each of the 8 questions one payoff-relevant round will be
randomly selected by the computer. Exactly as in phase I, your profit is based on the distance of your
estimation to the true value. The closer you are to the true value, the more money you earn (see
definition of score in instructions of phase I). Please note that, even if you play in group mode, solely
your own estimation affects your profit.
Your income from phase II is derived from the sum of points you have collected for each question in
the corresponding payoff-relevant round, whereas the exchange rate is still 1 point corresponds to
0,30 €. The maximal possible income in phase II is 38,40 €.
Total income
Your total income from the experiment consists of the guaranteed 5 €, plus your income from Phase
I, plus your income from phase II.
Your payoff as well as the correct answers will be provided by the end of the experiment.

Good luck!
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